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The objectives of this dissertation are to explain the production behavior of 
OPEC's member countries from 1971 to 1987 and to determine whether there was 
any structural shift in OPEC's production behavior after the organization attempted 
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to assign a quota to each member. This study focused on political and social as 
well as economic variables, in order to overcome the misspecification of previous 
models. 
In order to achieve the above objectives, the study used the following four 
models, with modifications: the cartel, competitive, target revenue, and property 
rights models. The double log multiple linear regression technique was used to 
operationalize the cartel, competitive, and target revenue models; simple linear 
regression was used to estimate the property rights model. The cartel model was 
based not only on economic variables but also on social and political variables. 
The internal political instability of each OPEC country was measured by the 
number of armed attacks within the country. 
The structural shift in OPEC's production behavior between the 1971-1982 
period and the 1983-1987 period was evaluated using the Chow-test. The Chow-
test showed no significant difference between these two periods for OPEC overall 
or for individual members. Thus, the two periods were combined so that the study 
was performed for the entire 1971-1987 period. Because this period of analysis 
was relatively short, alternative models were applied to pool the data and thereby 
increase the reliability of the model estimates. A cross-sectional correlated and 
time-wise auto-regressive model (CCTA) was selected to pool the data and to 
estimate OPEC's production coefficients. Then each individual OPEC member's 
production model was estimated and compared to the pooled model. 
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The results indicate that OPEC behaved as a cartel, and that a partial 
market-sharing hypothesis was significant for all 11 OPEC members. These 
findings indicate that OPEC was a loose cartel, with only partially effective 
cooperation on production decisions. Political instability was found to be 
significant (at the 10-percent level) overall, and it negatively affected production. 
It was also significant at the 5-percent level for the price-pusher group (Iran, 
Venezuela, and Algeria). This group was also the only one pooled using least 
squares with dummy variables (LSDV), because of its common slope and different 
intercepts. Overall results suggest that OPEC members were basing their 
production decisions on crude oil prices, excess production capacity, and each 
member's share of total OPEC output. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION/OVERVIEW 
The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) consists of 13 
member countries: Algeria, Ecuador, Gabon, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Ubya, 
Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.), and Venezuela. All of 
these countries have something in common: oil exports represent approximately 
90 percent of their total exports. The OPEC countries experienced economic 
prosperity throughout the 1971-1980 period. Oil revenues increased as a result 
of both high real oil prices and high production during the same period. The 
consequent windfall in revenue was the largest in OPEC history. This 
phenomenon created a surplus of approximately $100 billion in their current 
account balance. The high oil revenue enabled the OPEC countries to pursue and 
finance their national plans. Social programs were provided, and public 
satisfaction increased. During the 1980s, with the changing oil market conditions, 
the surplus in the current account balance was replaced with a deficit. The 
problem of the deficit was exacerbated by the decline in the oil real price after 
1983. As a consequence of decreased oil revenues, each OPEC member 
government had to rationalize its spending and reevaluate the effectiveness of its 
development programs. Furthermore, the decline in OPEC's oil revenues resulted 
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from production cuts and lower oil prices that were intensified by a lower world oil 
demand and higher non-OPEC production. 
These economic effects placed social and political pressures on some 
OPEC governments to increase oil revenues by increasing their oil production. 
The internal social and political pressures reflected those societies' dissatisfaction 
with their governments' production decisions. Therefore, the OPEC governments 
faced two problems: the competition of non-OPEC producers and the risk of 
sociopolitical pressures at home. In its production decisions, OPEC had to 
consider non-economic factors so as not to jeopardize its economic interests 
(Hedley, 1986). It is because of these factors that OPEC's pricing and production 
behavior is not well understood by professional, political, and OPEC analysts 
(Griffin and Teece, 1982). This misunderstanding is believed to arise from the 
diversity of social, economic, political, and developmental conditions among the 
member countries. Specifically, the countries have different geographic patterns, 
petroleum reserve levels, population sizes, political climates, and revenue needs 
for economic development (Ezzati, 1976). With such diversity among member 
countries, it is not surprising that OPEC's oil production behavior tends to 
confound the analysts viewing the situation from within the confines of a single 
diSCipline. 
The major purpose of this research is to analyze economic, social, and 
political conditions that might have an impact on OPEC's production behavior. 
The OPEC literature is full of models investigating this behavior, but most Qf these 
~-- ---~~~ -~ ---------------------------
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models rely solely on economic variables. Four such models are the cartel, 
competitive, property rights, and target revenue models. These models are 
modified in this study to include non-economic factors as well. 
PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The oil embargo of i 973, the Iranian revolution of 1979, and the Iran-Iraq 
war of 1980 disrupted the oil supply and raised oil prices. All of these political 
events testified that political instability existed in this region. This political instability 
could influence OPEC governments' decisions even in the absence of political 
crises. SOCiopolitical pressure was evident in some of the OPEC countries. For 
example, in 1985, there was a military coup against the Nigerian government; this 
coup was caused partially by a decline in the oil revenues (The Middle East 
Journal, 1986). Venezuela faced political and social unrestthrough the 1980s, and 
these activities were intensified by the reduction in world oil prices after 1983 
(Blank, 1984). Some activities reflecting internal unrest were evident in the Algerian 
situation in 1979; they increased through the 1980s when oil revenues started to 
decline. 
In another Situation, Saudi Arabia abandoned its role as residual supplier 
during the same period, not only because non-OPEC countries did not cooperate 
and some OPEC membeiS cheated on their quotas, but because Saudi Arabia 
found out that it could not meet its society's needs when its production was 
· " 
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declining to a level that was too low to generate enough revenues (The Middle 
East, 1986). 
The historical perspective of OPEC's behavior demonstrated the 
importance of considering non-economic factors as well as economic factors in 
order to really understand OPEC production behavior. Non-economic factors play 
an important role in determinlng OPEC's production behavior and can, at times, 
overrule economic factors in some OPEC countries (Tahmassebi, 1986). Reduced 
oil revenue to OPEC members may put social pressure on them to increase 
output. But political conflict or social instability within a member country or among 
members can affect oil production negatively; and this, in turn, results in higher oil 
prices (Curlee et aI., 1988). 
Moran (1982) argued that political security was significant in explaining 
Saudi Arabia's production, because the historical events of OPEC showed that 
Saudi Arabia adjusted its behavior to external and internal political pressure to 
avoid fomenting conflict within OPEC or with outsiders. Therefore, Saudi Arabia 
is concerned about its own security as well as that of other OPEC members. The 
problem here is that the ability of the previously used economic models to analyze 
OPEC's production behavior is limited by the exclusion of non-economic factors. 
This study deals with this problem by accounting for the effects of these non-
economic factors on OPEC's production decisions. 
5 
OBJECTIVES 
OPEC's production behavior is a complex issue because it relates to the 
political, economic, and social conditions of each OPEC member. The objectives 
of this study are to account for the effects of these factors on OPEC's production, 
to increase the knowledge and understanding of OPEC's production behavior, and 
to shed light on the uncertainties surrounding OPEC's Mure. 
The first task of this research is to test four alternative frameworks 
governing the organization's behavior: 
1. That OPEC behaves as a cartel to maximize its wealth, and it has a 
major influence on world oil prices. 
2. That OPEC's members are behaving as competitive producers, and 
oil production is determined by world oil market forces. 
3. That OPEC countries produce according to their investment needs. 
When these needs are satisfied, they produce less. 
4. That the transfer of ownership from the oil companies to the host 
countries in the 1970s resulted in production cuts and higher prices, reflecting a 
reduction in the implicit discount rate that accompanied the shift in property rights 
for oil resources. 
To test the above behaviors for each OPEC member, the following 
associated econometric models were used: cartel, competitive, target revenue, 
and property rights. 
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The second task is to apply the above models in analyzing the structural 
shift in OPEC's oil behavior over two periods: 1971-1982 and 1983-1987. In the 
first period, OPEC's higher prices were not considered by some economists to be 
caused by cartel behavior. Also, this period included such events as the oil 
embargo of 1973, the iranian revolution of 1979, and the Iran-Iraq war of 1980. 
The second period witnessed OPEC's first real effort to exercise cartel behavior 
with its strategy to limit production by assigning quotas to its members in 1983, 
thereby trying to create and maintain an overall production ceiling. 
SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS RESEARCH 
If it can be shown that internal social and political factors, as well as 
economic factors, have significant effects on members' oil production, analysis of 
OPEC's production decisions should account for the effects of these variables in 
the future. OPEC governments can secure their economic interests only if they 
know about their surrounding environments. Otherwise, the stability of member 
governments--and therefore the cartel--will be threatened. Greater cartel stability, 
therefore, will provide OPEC members with a more reasonable environment in 
which to plan and finance their development programs. 
ORGANIZATION OF THIS STUDY 
Chapter II gives the historical background of OPEC and a brief discussion 
of policies that OPEC has experimented with since its establishment. OPEC's 
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production and price patterns in the 1970s and 1980s are also reviewed. Chapter 
III begins with a discussion of the alternative theories of OPEC's production 
behavior--the oligopoly and industrial organization theories--and relates them to 
OPEC's behavior. Chapter IV discusses the alternative OPEC production models 
and identifies key determinants. This chapter sets up the frameworks for the 
conceptual models, model speCifications, and operationalization. Chapter V 
discusses the empirical results of the aiternative modeis. Chapter VI contains 
implications for OPEC's market share stability. in the short and long terms. 
Chapter VII includes the conclusions of the study. the limitations of the study. and 
suggestions for further research. 
CHAPTER II 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
OPEC's objectives and decisions have changed considerably since its 
establishment; they changed the most during the 1970s and 1980s. These 
changes have been direct results of non-economic events and competition from 
non-OPEC oil exporting countries. Also, the reduction in world energy 
consumption as well as the different interests of OPEC members regarding 
production and pricing decisions have significantly contributed to the observed 
changes. 
A BRIEF HISTORY OF OPEC 
In September 1960. representatives from the governments of Saudi Arabia, 
Kuwait, Iraq. Iran, and Venezuela met at a Baghdad conference. The final decision 
that came out of this conference was the creation of the Organization of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC). After the organization was established, new 
members joined: Qatar in 1961, Libya and Indonesia in 1962, Abu Dhabi in 1967, 
Algeria in 1969, Nigeria in 1971, Ecuador in 1973, U.A.E. in 1974, and Gabon in 
1975. With these additions, OPEC's organization includes a total of 13 members. 
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Articles 2 through 4 of the OPEC Charter define the organization's 
objectives as follows: 
Article 2 
A. The principal aim of the Organization shall be the 
coordination and unification of the petroleum policies of member 
countries and the determination of the best means for 
safeguarding their interests, individually and collectively. 
B. The Organization shall devise ways and means of 
ensuring the stabilization of prices in international oil markets with 
a view to eliminating harmful and unnecessary fluctuations. 
C. Due regard shall be given at aU times to the interests of 
the producing nations and to the necessity of securing a steady 
income to the producing countries; an efficient, economic and 
regular supply of petroleum to consuming nations; and a fair 
return on their capital to those investing in the Petroleum industry. 
Article 3 
The Organization shall be guided by the principle of the 
sovereign equality of its member countries. Member countries 
shall fulfill, in good faith, the obligations assumed by them in 
accordance with this Statute. 
Article 4 
If, as a resuit of the application of any decision of the 
Organization, sanctions are employed, directly or indirectly, by any 
interested company or companies against one or more member 
countries, no other member shall accept any offer of a beneficial 
treatment, whether in the form of an increase in oil exports or in 
an improvement in prices, which may be made to it by such 
interested company or companies with the intention of 
discouraging the application of the decision of the Organization. 
(Ghanem, 1986). 
The purpose of the creation of OPEC was to increase, or to at least 
prevent any further decline in, the posted price of oil in 1960. In pursuing the 
10 
organization's objectives, despite the oil companies' arguments that oil prices had 
been stable through the 1950-1956 period, the decline in posted oil prices during 
the late 1950s was a result of the oil surplus in the world oil market. However, 
OPEC failed to restore the price of oil to its pre-1960 level through the 1960-1970 
period and could not prevent any further declineo OPEC succeeded, however, in 
increasing its production from less than 8 million barrels a day (MBD) in 19SOa;to 
more than 25 MBD in 1971 (Evans, 1986). The OPEC countries attempted again 
to negotiate with the oil companies to raise their posted oil prices through 
meetings in September 1970 (the first Tripoli Agreement), February 1971 (the 
Tehran Agreement), and March 1971 (the second Tripoli Agreement) (Levy, 1982). 
As a result of these attempts, the posted price of oil increased in 1973. Historical 
analysis shows that OPEC's objectives were not only economic, but political as 
well. For example, at the end of 1973, OPEC used its power to cut its oil 
production in order to demonstrate to the world that it had political as well as 
economic influence. 
As a result of the 1973 embargo, OPEC's oil prices increased sharply and 
continued to increase through the rest of the 1970s. During the 1970s, OPEC 
used different economic strategies, such as the flexibility of Saudi Arabia's 
production as swing producer from 1974 to 1979, to maintain the organization's 
stability. In the middle of 1975, OPEC faced some disagreements about its oil 
price structure; these disagreements led to the official price of marker crude oil 
(Saudi Arabian 34° light oil), instead of posted crude oil prices. In January 1980, 
11 
OPEC abandoned marker crude oil; but in June of the same year, it agreed to 
return to marker crude with a ceiling of $32 per barrel, and it allowed up to $5 per 
barrel above the ceiling to account for oil quality differentiation. At that time, this 
was flexible marker crude, rather than the one established in 1973, which was fixed 
at $7 per banei (Evans, 1986). 
The Iranian revolution of 1979 a"d;·the Iran-Iraq war of 1980 disw.pJed 
OPEC's supply and subsequently affected OPEC's stability, but the organization 
did not break down. Instead, those members whose production was not affected 
by the war produced at maximum capacity to overcome the supply shortage. 
OPEC did not lose power in the oil market until the beginning of the 1980s; it lost 
power then because of the increase of non-OPEC supplies and the slow world oil 
demand that resulted from price shocks of 1973 and 1979. In 1983, OPEC tried 
again to coordinate the member countries' offers of limiting their production and 
to assign a quota to each of its members, but cheating by some members was a 
serious problem. Because some OPEC members were cheating, and non-OPEC 
countries did not cooperate with OPEC to stabilize the world oil market, Saudi 
Arabia began flooding the oil market in July 1986. Saudi Arabia's intention was to 
demonstrate to OPEC and non-OPEC countries that cooperation was beneficial 
to all of them (Mead, 1986). 
The history of OPEC showed that there had always been disagreement 
among OPEC members, because of the cartel's classical problems of self-interest; 
but the organization remains viable and is still trying to coordinate its members' 
- -_ .. -- ---------------------------
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production and to stabilize oil prices. For the reasons specified above, the 
organization might have been weaker in the 1980s than it was in the 1970s; 
however, despite the instability, it is still viable, considering the overall benefits of 
the members' cooperation. 
OPEC AND THE OIL MARKET 1971-1987 
OPEC's oil supplies were disrupted twice, as a result of political events in 
1973 and 1979. In 1973, the real oil price was about $4 per barrel (in constant 
1982 dollars); in 1974, because of the oil embargo which led to a cut in 
production, the price jumped to almost $18 per barrel. At the same time, a new 
event occurred--the nationalization of oil companies in OPEC's host countries--and 
it was completed by the end of 1974. Ownership was transferred from the oil 
companies to OPEC's host countries because of concern about the future of their 
resources. This transfer led to a lower discount rate from the one oil companies 
had previously charged. The lower discount meant less production, which caused 
the oil prices to increase (Joheny, 1978). 
OPEC's real oil prices were stable at approximately $18 per barrel through 
the 1974-1979 period; during this period, production was stable at approximately 
30 MBD (only in 1975 did production decrease to 27 MBD, as shown in Figure 1). 
The stabilit)' in OPEC's production could be attributed to the action of Saudi Arabia 
as the residual supplier. Despite the stability in OPEC's production, its share of 
the world oil market declined from 68 percent in 1974 to 64 percent in 1979 
r---------------~~~------------~ 
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(Figure 2). The 4-percent loss in OPEC's market share was caused by the change 
in the world oil market structure after 1975. OPEC's production was affected by 
non-OPEC oil supplies, which increased from about 14 MBD in 1974 to almost 18 
MBD in 1979 (Figure 3). The loss in OPEC's market share was relatively small 
because the world's consumption was increasing: world consumption increased 
from 44 MBD in 1975 to 52.2 MBD in 1979 (Figure 4). The second change that 
occurred in the market cond1ljons between 1979 and 1980 was due to both the 
Iranian political revolution of 1979 and the Iran-Iraq war of 1980. These events led 
to a disruption in the oil supplies of Iran and Iraq. Iranian oil production was 
reduced from 5.21 MBD in 1978 to 1.38 MBD in 1981 (Figure 5). Iraqi production 
was reduced from 3.5 MBD in 1978 to .92 MBD in 1983 (Figure 6). This disruption 
in oil supplies caused the price of oil to increase in real value from $17.73 per 
barrel in 1975 to $34 per barrel in 1982. However, OPEC's real oil price started 
declining in 1984 and then reached its lowest point of $17.50 per barrel in 1987. 
The high oil prices of 1973 and 1979 intensified non-OPEC competition. Non-
OPEC production increased to almost 23 MBD in 1987. The world's oil 
consumption did not respond to the oil price shock of 1973, but it did respond to 
the second shock of 1979. Thus, world oil consumption decreased from its 
highest point of 52.2 MBD in 1979 to 45.3 MBD in 1983. At the end of 1983, the 
world's oil consumption started to recover, and it reached 48.9 MBD in 1987. 
Lower oil consumption, the non-OPEC supply increase, and high oil prices all 
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contributed to a sharp decline in OPEC's market share from 65 percent in 1978 
to 41 percent in 1985. 
OPEC's market share stability was affected by the increase in the reserves-
to-production ratio increased from 16.17 in 1980 to 29.55 in 1985, while its 
production declined from 26.94 MBD in 1980 to 16.12 MBD in 1985. In 1986, 
OPEC's reserves-to-production ratio declined, and during the same period OPEC's 
production increased by 2.42 MBD; this increase was furthered by an increase in 
the world's energy consumption as the real oil prices declined by $1.67 per barrel. 
But in 1987, OPEC's production declined to 17.76 MBD; this decline caused an 
increase of 1.29 in the reserves-to-production ratio (Figure 7). The real OPEC 
price did not increase that year, but instead it declined to $14.85 per barrel. 
OPEC had changed its behavior since 1981. It cut its production from 27 
MBD in 1980 to 17.8 MBD in 1987, by assigning quotas to its members from 1983 
to 1987 to increase its real oil price. In 1987, however, the price declined sharply 
to $14.85 per barrel, and the cheating on quotas by some members might have 
contributed to this price decline (Table I). OPEC realized that its market share was 
declining in the early 1980s, so it made a decision to abandon its official selling 
price in 1985. Saudi Arabia, the biggest OPEC producer, adopted a netback 
pricing policy as a strategy to expand its market share, but this mechanism 
caused instability in the world energy market. In 1987, OPEC decided to return 
to its official selling price in order to stabilize the world oil market (Evans, 1986). 
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TABLE I 
HOW OPEC MEMBERS OBSERVED OR IGNORED PRODUCTION QUOTAS 
Production 
1986 
Dec. 
Saudi 4353 
Kuwait 999 
Iran 2317 
Iraq 1780 
U.A.E. 950 
Qatar 300 
Indonesia 1193 
Nigeria 1304 
Venezuela 1574 
Libya 999 
Eacudor 221 
Gabon 160 
Quotas Production 
1987 1987 
First halt 
4133 
Second halt yearlFir.9 montbs 
948 
2255 
1466 
902 
285 
1133 
1238 
1495 
948 
210 
152 
4343 
996 
2369 
1540 
948 
299 
1190 
1301 
1571 
996 
221 
159 
4238 
972 
2312 
1503 
925 
292 
1160 
1270 
1533 
972 
216 
156 
4169 
1331 
2346 
2021 
1350 
276 
1182 
1226 
1582 
1046 
128 
155 
source: International Petroleum Encyclopedia, 1988. 
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Despite high real oil prices during the 1980-1986 period, OPEC's financial 
situation was weaker until 1985; its current account balance reached its all-time 
peak of $100.21 billion in 1980, then declined sharply reaching a deficit of $7.31 
billion in 1982 and a larger deficit of $19.72 billion in 1983. The OPEC account 
balance deficit was $3.68 billion in 1984; but a sudden turnaround occurred, and 
by 1985 there was a $6.5 billion surplus. The biggest deficits in OPEC's current 
account balance in recent years were about $20 billion in 1986 and about $7 billion 
in 1987 (Figure 8). These deficits were caused by the declining OPEC market 
share and increases in financial needs driven by ambitious development programs 
and lower oil prices. 
OPEC BEHAVIOR 
The argument that OPEC was a cartel and that it had the power to set the 
price of oil is not supported by the history of events prior to 1973. During the first 
decade of OPEC, oil companies actually determined oil prices. Between 1971 and 
1973, oil prices were driven by the outcome of the Tehran Agreement An 
empirical test of OPEC's behavior showed that OPEC did not adjust its prices to 
the change in economic conditions from 1974 to 1979; rather, OPEC increased its 
real price of oil by $12 per barrel in 1979, and this price increase was not related 
to production constraints. In 1984, OPEC attempted to constrain its production 
and maintain its production ceiling (Lowinger, et aI., 1985). 
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As the real price of crude oil fell from approximately $34 per barrel in 1981 
to $32.60 in 1983, OPEC responded with typical cartel behavior (Le., setting 
production quotas) in an attempt to stabilize oil prices. Production cuts were 
allocated among the dominant OPEC producers. Excluding the output of the 
dominant producers and Iran and Iraq, OPEC output remained constant during 
this period; and this finding suggested the independent behavior of these 
countries. Consequently, Mead (1982; 1986) rejected the claims of OPEC's unity 
and its effectiveness as a cartel. 
The diversity of economic interests among OPEC members led some 
economists to divide the OPEC cartel into subgroups. Hnyilicza and Pindyck 
(1976) used a Cournot-Nash cooperative solution to analyze OPEC's pricing 
structure. They divided OPEC into spender countries (Iran, Venezuela, Indonesia, 
Algeria, Nigeria, and Ecuador) and saver countries (Saudi Arabia, Ubya, Iraq, 
U.A.E., Kuwait, and Qatar). They suggested that the two groups viewed price and 
production policies differently. Specifically, they noted that saver countries had 
less of a need for cash flow, and that their implicit discount rate on their oil 
resources was lower than that of spender nations. When the output was 
unconstrained, the cartel consisting of subgroups adopted a pricing policy that 
approximated a monopolistic price level. On the other hand, when output was 
controlled, the optimal price policy would be decided by the bargaining power 
between the saver and spender groups, so that a cooperative agreement could 
be reached (Hnyilicza and Pindyck, 1976). 
--------------------------.-------
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Eckbo (1979) divided OPEC into three categories: the core countries 
(Saudi Arabia. Kuwait. U.A.E., Qatar, and Ubya), which could sell their petroleum 
at lower prices than the other two groups; the price-pusher countries (Iran, 
Venezuela, Algeria, and Gabon), which had very limited resources and greater 
needs for current income; and the expansionist fringe countries (Indonesia, 
Nigeria, Iraq, and Ecuador), which had strong needs for current income but 
smaller reserves than the core countries, and which produced at slower rates of 
depletion than the price-pusher countries. Also, this group wanted a higher 
market share. 
The OPEC member countries were classified into dominant and fringe 
groups by economists using cluster analysis (Mohammad, 1984). The dominant 
group consisted of Saudi Arabia, U.A.E., and Qatar. These group members had 
the ability to alter their output levels; they could produce at lower prices than 
members of the fringe group (Iran, Nigeria, and Indonesia), and they could 
influence the prices set by other participants in the oil market. Dominant group 
behavior was evident from 1974 to 1979. The fringe group's ability to make output 
changes was limited, and they demanded higher prices. Ubya, Algeria, Venezuela, 
Ecuador, and Gabon were considered part of the fringe group, even though they 
could alter output levels. Kuwait was considered a saver country, because it could 
adjust its output but it demanded a higher price. In general, the OPEC member 
countries' goals were to maximize the current value of their resources. These 
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findings demonstrated that an economic incentive could create conflict among 
OPEC members. 
Cartel stability stems from agreement among members on price, and 
production policies; but the pursuit of diverse interests among OPEC member 
countries continues to be a serious problem. A country with small oil reserves and 
a large need for foreign exchange has different needs from those of a country with 
large reserves and less of a need for foreign exchange. These differences have 
created problems regarding formulation of output and price policies that best 
serve the overall interests of OPEC. As suggested by Blitzer et al. (1975), conflicts 
may be ultimately resolved if a group of countries acts as a price leader in 
reducing its price to the level of the price taker. Therefore, excess capacity is 
important in assisting the position of the price leader to implement such a policy. 
Market-sharing agreements can provide the means for the cartel to coordinate its 
decisions and enhance its stability. 
Ezzati (1976) argued that OPEC could resolve these conflicts by assigning 
production quotas to members. Countries with lower oil revenue absorptive 
capacity should decrease production, while countries with higher oil revenue 
absorptive capacity should increase production. This action stabilizes the price of 
oil, because the ability of each OPEC member's economy to absorb oil revenues 
influences the stability of the cartel. Also, the real oil price and the reserve rate 
can alter OPEC's market share. Therefore, we can conclude that the future OPEC 
oil supply depends on three factors: the production capacity of each OPEC 
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member country, the internal demand for its oil, and the absorptive capacity of its 
countries' economies for oil revenues. 
Furthermore, OPEC price-setting behavior depends on the elasticity of oil 
supply and demand; but in the long run, interest rates and reserve levels will have 
a significant influence on the optimal price level (Reza, 1984). Furthermore, the 
exchange rate, as a reflection of the change in the real value of the dollar in 
relation to foreign currencies, can figure into OPEC production and price activity, 
because oil is traded in dollars in the world market. The activity of non-OPEC 
members, whether they are acting as output or price maximizers, affects the 
market shares of OPEC members. Furthermore, OPEC core-member behavior 
has a significant impact on the stability of OPEC's market share. As the market 
share of the cartel core increases, and its reserves-to-production ratio decreases, 
market share stability occurs and eliminates undesired excess capacity (Daly et aI., 
1982). 
Market share stability serves as an effective strategy for narrowing the gap 
between production level and excess capacity. Excess capacity levels were 
evident in the mid-1980s. Rapidly declining oil prices in 1982 and 1983 were 
responsible for OPEC's market share instability. It was extremely difficult for OPEC 
to cut production significantly in order to maintain a high price level. But in a 
situation where the price is low, OPEC does not have to reduce its output, 
because a lower price will increase the demand for OPEC oil in the Mure. thereby 
redUCing excess capacity (International Petroleum Encyclopedia, 1988). 
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In general, one part of the OPEC literature indicated that the increase in 
prices in 1970s was not related to OPEC's behavior as a cartel, whereas the other 
part indicated that the stability of OPEC during the 1974-1979 period was related 
to the dominant producer's behavior. But there was agreement that OPEC acted 
as a cartel in 1983, by restricting its output and maintaining its production ceiling 
in order to increase or at least stabilize the oil prices. Also, this literature clearly 
revealed that OPEC has diversified economic and political interests that could lead 
to the cartel's instability. Overall, market share stability would best serve OPEC's 
interests. 
CHAPTER III 
MARKET STRUCTURE THEORIES 
OLIGOPOLY THEORY 
A cartel is an organizational structure in which the producers all agree on 
the price structure and production limit, with mutually agreeable market shares. 
The cartel can maximize its profit by dividing the production among its producers 
so that marginal production costs are all identical. The level at which the profit-
maximizing cartel would produce is determined by restricting output to such an 
extent that the common marginal production costs are equal to the marginal 
revenue for the group. But the oligopolists typically do not maximize their joint 
profit, because their different interests regarding output and price make the 
coordination a difficult task (Griffin and Teece, 1982). 
Oligopoly theory focuses on the study of market concentrati~n. A tight 
oligopoly entails a high level of concentration, and a loose oligopoly entails a low 
level of concentration, in a particular market (Kaysen and Turner. 1959). Market 
concentration exists in a market when a few sellers have control over the price and 
output of a particular product in the same industry. An oligopoly formulation 
represents an interaction or interdependence among a few sellers in an industry 
(Friedman, 1983). The interdependence can be realized by oligopolistic firms 
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when the concentration ratio reaches a certain level. The concentration ratio level 
can vary from 25 percent for the largest two firms to 70 percent for the largest 
eight firms in the market (Nicholson, 1985). 
Under an oligopolistic structure, effective collusion and coordination 
among firms enable them to charge higher prices for their goods than they could 
as independents, thereby maximizing their profits. The collusion is possible if the 
benefits exceed the overall costs and risks associated with this type of collusion, 
because the benefits of collusion are negatively related to the level of demand 
elasticity and positively related to the elasticity of the industry's marginal cost 
(Joheny, 1978). Agreement among members on the level of output and price 
structure is more likely when the number of producers is not large enough to 
create a conflict among members. This is because the market demand is divided 
among many producers, and this division has an impact on the profit level. Also, 
cheating can be a serious problem. because it is very difficult to detect the cheater 
and enforce the agreement. However, other studies suggest that tacit collusion 
is possible even with a large number of firms, but that it is more likely with just a 
few firms (Dulbear et aI., 1968). 
Oligopolistic models range from classical models (such as Cournot and 
Bertrand) to modern models (such as the Stackelberg and conjectural variation 
models which are based on the game theory). These models analyze the 
reactions of the competitive producers and the new entrants to the market. They 
have different assumptions about the behavior of other producers. When a 
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number of firms sell a homogeneous product in such a market, and their objective 
is to maximize their profits but they expect that the output of other firms will stay 
the same and the market will determine the price, these firms are facing the 
Cournot equilibrium. Sometimes these firms have knowledge about the reactions 
of other firms in the same market, so they can choose an optimal strategy that 
maximizes their profits, as Stackelberg explained. Bertrand explained that 
oligopolists can set their own prices, under the assumption that the other 
producers will keep their prices constant. But if the product is differentiated, the 
producer can obtain a degree of monopolistic power over its product brands 
(Clarke, 1985). Furthermore, Cournot explains that producers with large market 
shares will have more power to dictate the market; but under Bertrand's model, 
there is no relationship between more market concentration and the market power 
of a homogeneous product. Recently, some economists have developed models 
based on the game theory to analyze the interaction among oligopolists. The 
conjectural variation model is one of these models. It analyzes the 
interdependence among firms, the way the variation of one firm's output can affect 
the market price, and the way the output of other firms may affect the market price 
indirectly. These models are criticized because of Cournot's assumption of other 
firms' constant output; Stackelberg has a disequilibrium problem in determining 
which firm is the leader and which is the follower; Bertrand is erroneous in his 
assumption that other firms' price reactions will be constant (Nicholson, 1985). 
- .. ~- .. ~. ------------------------------
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INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION THEORY 
Oligopolistic models do not account for all factors that may have effects 
on market behavior, but the industrial organization models offer more explanations 
for all these factors and their effects on market behavior (Nicholson, 1985). 
Burgess (1990) asserted that the industrial organization theory explains the 
relationship among certain attributes that are related to a particular industry. This 
theory explains the relationship among demand, supply, and market 
characteristics, all of which he called basic conditions. These basic elements are 
the ones that define the industry's structure. 
In general, the industrial organization theory studies the market structure, 
and the way the firm conducts its business in order to enhance its performance. 
Most industrial organization economists divide the field into three categories: (a) 
market structure, which is the result of basic conditions such as cost, demand, and 
technology; (b) firm conduct; and (c) economic performance. Market structure 
describes the supply side of the market--specifically, the industry as a whole, the 
number and size of each firm, product differentiation, economies of scale, and 
barriers to entry. Based on these factors, the firm's conduct is established. Firm 
conduct encompasses firm price structure, product differentiation, advertising. 
investment, research and development, and other factors that might affect the 
firm's behavior, such as rival actions and the outcomes of market structure. 
Economic performance includes market efficiency, equity, the industry's expansion 
over time, and new product innovation (Clarke, 1985). 
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BARRIERS TO ENTRY AND MARKET CONCENTRATION 
Substantial concentration can deter entry and make collusion more 
effective. Bain (1956) classified the barriers to entry into three categories: 
absolute cost, product differentiation, and economies-of-scale advantages of the 
established firms. Also, he sub-classified the entry conditions and their influences 
on the firm's profit into three levels. A very high barrier level occurs when the 
established firm price is about 10 percent or more above its minimal costs, a 
substantial barrier level when the price is about 7 percent above minimal costs, 
and a moderate-to-Iow barrier level when the price is 4 percent or less above 
minimal costs. Basically, this differentiation explains the relationship between 
concentration and profrt level. The biggest firms in the industry with very high 
barriers to entry will have more profits than the biggest firms with either substantial 
or moderate-to-Iow entry barriers. High levels of concentration in any industry lead 
to more profit, but this can be more effective among firms with substantial entry 
barriers. Therefore, concentration has a positive effect on the collusion level, and 
this effect leads to higher profits for the largest firms with substantial levels of entry 
barriers. 
The demand price elasticities for oligopolistic firms determine their 
behavior if they are trying to prevent entry in the way Bain (1956) explained, to 
maximize their profits or economies of scale. Inelastic demand means the firm 
wants to deter entry and not make a profit at scale maximization (Koutsoyiannis, 
1984). 
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Gort (1963) stated that barriers to entry do indeed contribute to the 
relationship between concentration and market share stability, since barriers to 
entry encourage concentration. Hence, it is possible to have a positive relationship 
between concentration and stability of market share. However, it is important to 
note that stability may be negatively related to excess profits, because a higher-
than-normal profit draws new entrants into the market, and new entrants in turn 
destabilize the market share. Highly concentrated industries have more stable 
prices than do those with low concentration, while the group facing medium 
barriers to entry has more stable prices than those industries with higher or lower 
barriers (Qualls, 1975). Rice (1979) criticized the contention of price stability in 
more highly concentrated industries, and he suggested that there is no significant 
relationship between concentration and price stability. 
EXCESS CAPACITY AND MARKET SHARE STABIlITY 
Some elements of market structure, such as excess capacity of 
production, that are available to the oligopolists can make the collusion more 
effective. In the short term, oligopolists produce until the price becomes lower 
than the average variable cost. But large excess capacity makes the firm's fIXed 
cost greater than the average marginal cost, which gives the firm more of an 
incentive to produce at a low price level. Consequently, this act can lead to 
instability of the oligopolistic firms (Nicholson, 1985). 
One producer (or group of producers) that has a large excess output can 
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act as a dominant producer to influence the market price. A dominant producer 
is different from a monopolistic producer, because the dominant producer 
recognizes that an increase in its price may lead to output expansion by the 
competitive fringe, a possibility that the monopolist may not consider. Also, the 
dominant producer's decision is influenced by the rate of the fringe competition's 
expansion. the profit's maximum level. and the level of the discount rate. All of 
these factors can change the dominant producer's behavior so that it may reduce 
its price to prevent the fringe competition from expanding and increasing their 
market share. On the other hand. it can sustain its price by cutting its production 
and losing part of its market share to the fringe competitors in the long term 
(Martin. 1988). 
MARKET STRUCTURE AND OPEC'S 
MARKET SHARE STABILITY 
Crude oil can be differentiated according to the level of quality: light crude 
oil (low-sulfur). or heavy crude oil (high-sulfur). This difference in quality is the 
reason light oil is more expensive than heavy oil. When the price gap between 
light and heavy oil was widening during the 1970s. some refineries started to 
modify their equipment to process heavy oil. which was less expensive than light 
oil; this change led to a higher demand for heavy oil than for light oil. This was 
one reason OPEC had problems with the price differentiation and therefore 
narrowed the price gap between light oil and heavy oil. Because the price 
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differential between light and heavy oil is reduced, crude oil can be considered a 
homogeneous product (Martin, 1988). 
Another factor this study cannot ignore is that crude oil is an exhaustible 
resource. Crude oil production depends on the ratio of reserves to production; 
the smaller the ratio, the less oil there will be in the future, and vice versa. Crude 
oil is a non-renewable resource, which is available in a fixed supply determined by 
geological factors. To distinguish between renewable resources and non-
renewable resources is to consider that the structure of the crude oil price is not 
set by only its marginal cost of production, as is the case with renewable products, 
because the decision to produce a barrel of oil today may not be replaced in the 
future. Instead, the crude oil price is set by its marginal production cost plus 
(MCP J the user cost (opportunity cost) (UJ. The decision to produce oil today 
depends on the future discount rate. The higher the discount, the less oil will be 
left; the lower the discount, the more oil will be left. With non-renewable resources, 
th~ marginal costs today (MCPt) should include the user cost (UJ at the same time; 
this cost is different from the conventional marginal cost (MCt) for a private firm. 
In other words: 
MCt = MCPt + Uta 
The theory of exhaustible resources assumes that all producers are wealth 
maximizers, that they produce to maximize their present value before their 
resources are exhausted. The user cost (UJ is the difference between the 
------------------------------~ ... 
38 
marginal production cost (MCPt) and the marginal revenue (M~) (Griffin and Teece, 
1982): 
Ut = M~ - MCPt• 
Hotelling (1931) analyzed the market of exhaustible resources both under 
a perfect competition and under a monopoly. He applied his models to Persian 
Gulf oil and assumed that the marginal production cost of oil in the Gulf equaled 
zero. In a competitive market, the price of oil equals the user costs only, and the 
price of oil rises at the discount rate. Hotelling indicated that under a competitive 
market, the oil price should rise at the annual interest rate, assuming that the social 
discount equals the interest rate. Under a monopolistic market, the marginal 
revenue of the monopolist rises at the interest rate over time. 
The inherent critical relationships between production and reserves in 
OPEC's cartel behavior make the oligopoly theory ideally suitable to the study of 
OPEC's pricing and production activity. The level of concentration in reserves is 
more relevant to organizational structure than the level of concentration in 
production is, because reserves are seen as an indicator of potential production 
(Markham et aI., 1977). OPEC controls a significant proportion of the world's 
proven crude oil reserves. Thus, in 1973, OPEC's high level of concentration in 
production, OPEC's reserves, and the high cost of oil extraction and the low 
production capacity of non-OPEC producers gave OPEC the leading edge in 
setting oil prices (Oasgupta and Heal, 1979). Despite all the arguments that 
OPEC's structure differs from that of a conventional oligopoly, whereas the main 
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objective of a private firm is to maximize its profit, the aim of government is 
political, social, and economic development. The profit: motive can still influence 
the government oligopoly, while at other times political and social influences may 
be more important. In a private oligopoly, political and social factors are less 
important than profit maximization (AI-Nasrawi, 1985). 
Large excess capacity is concentrated in the hands of OPEC producers, 
especially the core producing members. This can give the core producers the 
power to maintain the cartel's stability. Excess capacity can be used as a 
measure to discipline any member who is cheating. It is evident that Saudi Arabia 
used its excess capacity to discipline OPEC and non-OPEC countries in 1986, in 
order to force internal agreement and to gain non-OPEC cooperation. But, excess 
capacity cannot be taken for granted as a stabilizing factor, because excess 
capacity can encourage those members with high capacity to cheat in order to 
avoid the cost structure and maximize their market shares (Martin, 1988). 
Agreement among members (Le., collusion) to set quotas and prices 
enhances the position of the OPEC oligopoly, which in turn may provoke the rival 
action of non-OPEC producers. A rival's reaction serves to weaken the level of 
collusion. Johnson (1983) explained that cartel stability can be maintained when 
production demand with a large part of the market share is inelastic and the 
supply of non-OPEC producing countries has low elasticity. According to the 
market-sharing cartel model, oligopolists tend to share the market based on their 
output and price decisions. In the short term, a change in the cartel's market 
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share that has not resulted from fundamental determinants of wealth-maximizing 
behavior (such as reserve size) is caused by political and social factors. But the 
market share is not the only factor leading to market share stability, because the 
market share itself can be affected by reserve levels and other factors. In other 
words, if the reserve level of one of the cartel members is declining, it should not 
be seen as a threat to the cartel's stability (Daly et aI., 1982). Because the interest 
of the oligopolists is profit maximization, a fixed market share is the most efficient 
method for preventing any secret price cutting within the organization. There is 
some evidence suggesting that higher concentration may help to deter cheating 
(Stigler, 1964). Also, the level of collusive prices depends upon the conditions of 
entry into the industry, as well as the elasticity of demand. 
Market structure influences the oligopolist's behavior. Heggestad and 
Rhoades (1976) supported the hypothesis that market structure determines the 
market share and that the greater the concentration, the greater the stability of the 
market share. Havrilesky and Barth (1969) confirmed what microeconomic theory 
had long predicted: that highly concentrated industries and product-differentiated 
industries have stable market shares. McGuckin (1972) indicated that the 
relationship between market share and entry is a negative one, and that it has a -
significant impact on the concentration ratio. Concentration alone cannot deter 
entry, and entry can lead to a reduction in market share. 
The dominant model could be applied to Saudi Arabia, which has the 
biggest oil reserve and production capacity within OPEC. Saudi Arabia could 
~~-~~-----~-- - -------
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establish the cartel price and give the other members opportunities to expand their 
production; then Saudi Arabia supplies the residual demand. Nobody denies that 
Saudi Arabia influences the world oil market, but there is disagreement among 
economists about the dominant behavior of Saudi Arabia. Griffin and Teece (1982) 
rejected the dominant-producer model for Saudi Arabia, because the Saudi 
production share was a much larger percentage of the total OPEC production in 
1980 than in 1973. Also, Griffin (1985) found that Saudi Arabia does not vary its 
production inversely to the production of other OPEC countries, and therefore the 
leadership of Saudi Arabia is rejected. 
Moran (1982) argued that Saudi Arabia understood its leadership very well 
and that it approached the issue in an intelligent way. The sensitivity of its position 
should be considered--economically, socially, and politically--within OPEC and 
among outsiders. External and internal political pressures on Saudi Arabia make 
its leadership different from the leadership of big firms that are less sensitive to 
political pressures. OPEC is both an economic and a political organization. In 
consideration of this fact, Griffin's specification should be modified to allow for 
political variables in the dominant-producer model, because the leadership of the 
Saudi government does not have the same motives that the private sector has. 
Moran insisted that the economic and political stability of Saudi Arabia explained 
its behavior as a dominant producer. 
CHAPTER IV 
ALTERNATIVE MODELS OF OPEC PRODUCTION 
CARTEL MODEL 
Quite an array of models has been used to analyze OPEC's production 
and pricing behavior. Gately and Kyle (19n) used two dynamic simulation 
models. The first analyzed OPEC's output and profit based on a fixed price path; 
the second analyzed different price paths, based on simple rule-of-thumb pricing 
strategies, to evaluate different market conditions. The models assumed that 
OPEC acted monolithically. The study compared many OPEC price strategies and 
concluded that the best one charged a highly discounted present value and was 
the most cautious about the consequences of high prices. 
Another application was based on the assumption that OPEC was 
monopolistic and shared the oil market with a competitive fringe. The study 
concluded that the price increase at the time was indeed related to OPEC's cartel 
behavior (Cremer and Weitzman, 1976). Kalymon (1975) employed two economic 
models. The first, a long-term optimization model of oil resource utilization, 
analyzed the influence of reserve size, demand elasticity, and time preference on 
price equilibrium. The second was a simulation model of market sharing used to 
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evaluate each OPEC member's structure according to a different price path. The 
findings were that the optimal OPEC price was sensitive to the opportunity cost of 
capital, the substitution cost in importing countries, and the collusion structure of 
OPEC, but that it was relatively insensitive to the size of reserves and the domestic 
market growth rate of OPEC countries. Lower oil prices discouraged exploration 
of oil resources, whereas high oil prices encouraged development of energy 
alternatives in importing countries. 
Najafizadeh (1985) developed a Nash-Cournot non-cooperative model of 
the world oil market. He assumed that the world oil industry consisted of small 
producers acting as price takers (the fringe) and of large producers acting 
independently in the market. He asserted that there was a low degree of 
interdependence among large producers in OPEC during the 1973-1979 period. 
This interdependence in turn implied that the output behavior of large producers 
in OPEC was close to a Nash-Cournot non-cooperative solution and that this was 
a direct result of independent profIt maximization by these producers. A1-Sahlawi 
(1986) estimated the oil supply of Saudi Arabia for the 1970-1984 period and the 
pooled sample of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) for the 1974-1984 period. 
The production of these countries was determined by the lag of oil production, the 
proven oil reserves, and the oil production from other OPEC countries and from 
non-OPEC countries. The findings were that Saudi Arabia's supply and GCe's 
supply had elasticities of .44 and .36, respectively. Also, the study indicated that 
political factors did influence OPEC's production decisions. 
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Griffin (1985) analyzed each OPEC member country's production 
according to a market-sharing cartel model that analyzed the changes in OPEC's 
market shares over time, where OPEC demand (0°) could be derived from the 
difference between the world demand and the non-OPEC supply (aO = world 
demand - non-OPEC supply), which was equivalent to OPEC production. Each 
OPEC member's production (OJ is a fraction of other OPEC aggregate production 
(oo0n>. 
The cartel model was: 
O - P Bi 0 ooBi it - it it 
where (P) was the real price of oil. 
Griffin's study of the 1971-1983 period estimated the above parameters 
and demonstrated that the partial market-sharing cartel model served to explain 
OPEC production behavior better than other OPEC production models did. 
COMPETITIVE MODEL 
MacAvoy (1982) examined OPEC's behavior from 1966 to 1972 and 
claimed that market fundamentals, such as reserves and prices, were responsible 
for OPEC's production behavior during this period. In an open market situation, 
the price of oil could rise to four-fifths or more of the current price because of the 
political events in the 1970s. The market fundamentals, under open market 
conditions, led to an increase in demand, which then caused an increase in the 
price of oil during the 1970s. The high oil price was not related to cartel behavior. 
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Griffin (1985) explained that the price increase in the 1970s could be 
attributed to changes in expected user costs, an increase in the demand for oil, 
and a decline in oil discovery rates. He stated that under the competitive model, 
the current production (CJ was a function of price (PJ, perceived user costs (Uit), 
and current extraction costs (MJ: 
Cit = F (Pit' Uit, Mit). 
Because of the lack of data on Uit and Mit, Griffin specified production as 
a function of the real oil price. The competitive model was expressed: 
Cit = f (PitBi) 
A positive sign of Bj means that competition in the oil market exists. The 
competitive model did not explain OPEC behavior, and it was also rejected for 10 
OPEC members. Furthermore, the test for the effects of price and reserve lags did 
not change the outcome of the model. 
. TARGET REVENUE MODEL 
The basis of the target revenue theory was that OPEC members produced 
to satisfy certain needs, such as financial needs to support their national 
development plans. The need for revenue was a function of the absorptive 
capacity of each member's economy. If the market was small and the 
infrastructure was inadequate, then the country's economy would fail to absorb the 
domestic investment. The target revenue model was good for short-term analysis 
------------------------_.- - .... 
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(Griffin and Teece, 1982). Since each country produced to fill its needs, when oil 
prices rose, the country should have curtailed production to ensure that revenue 
remained constant, assuming that the needs of the country remained constant. 
Consequently, less production meant higher prices with lower depletion rates of 
oil resources (Adelman, 1982). The target revenue model was criticized, because 
it ignored foreign investment as a possible alternative to domestic investment for 
,t; a country with limited absorptive capacity (Griffin and Teece, 1982). 
In analyzing the target revenue hypothesis, Griffin (1985) used real fixed 
domestic capital formation as a measure of investment needs. He specified each 
OPEC member's production as a function of the real oil price and investment need 
(IJ. The target revenue model was expressed: 
ait = f (PitBi• litYi) 
The underlying assumptions of this model are that the domestic investment 
requirements have to be determined by each OPEC member first, that there 
should be no foreign investment, and that the investment should depend only on 
oil revenue. Thus, if Bi = 1, then the increase in production should be 
proportionate to the increase in investment needs. If there is an increase in the 
price (Yi = -1) and the investment need is fixed, then the production should be 
reduced proportionately. On the basis of Griffin's findings, the target revenue 
model was rejected as an explanation for OPEC's production behavior. 
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PROPERTY RIGHTS MODEL 
Joheny (1978) contended that the quadrupling of oil prices in 1973 
resulted from a shift in ownership from the interactive oil companies to the host 
countries. Joheny indicated that in the 1950s and 1960s, oil companies 
anticipated that nationalization would eventually occur in the 1970s, and this 
nationalization would have led to lower discount rates than the oil companies' 
discount rates. Thus. the production was shifted from the future to the present 
time. On the other hand, the discount rate was shifted to a lower level than 
previously. The shift in property rights was completed by the end of 1973 through 
the nationalization of the oil companies. As a result, the host country's discount 
rate was lower than that which was charged by the international companies. It 
was the discount rate that led to the production cutback and higher prices. 
Adelman (1982) criticized the property rights model because the production cut 
of 1973-1974 was caused by the oil embargo and not by the lower discount rate. 
Also, the host countries were demanding higher production from the companies 
during the 1950s and 1960s. Whereas the price increase of 1973-1974 may have 
been the result cf the property rights transfer, that transfer did not seem to 
account for the increase of 1978-1979, since the discount rate was not an issue 
then (Griffin and Teece, 1982). 
According to Griffin (1985), the property rights theory explains production 
as a function of the percentage of total oil production that is government-controlled 
~ ""-" --------------------------------
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(G~. A high percentage of government-controlled production leads to production 
cutbacks. The property rights model was expressed: 
0it = f (GJ 
The percentage of government equity oil (Git) is used as a measure of 
government-controlled oil production. 
IDENTIFICATION AND MEASUREMENT OF KEY DETERMINANTS 
Market Share Stability 
The market share can be stable under an equilibrium situation, in which 
there-is an absence of rapid growth and no change in demand or technology 
(Gort, 1963). But exogenous disturbances, such as a change in demand or the 
cost condition facing the industry. can affect market share stability. Also, extensive 
excess capacity can alter the equilibrium. However, effective collusion, as one of 
the market elements, stabilizes market share. The market structure influence in 
oligopolistic behavior and in the stability of market share can be tested under two 
conditions: if there is effective collusion between producers, and if all exogenous 
disturbances affecting the level of collusion between members are constant (Caves 
and Porter, 1978). High concentration leads to effective collusion between 
members and, in tum, stabilizes their market shares (Heggestad and Rhoades, 
1976). 
49 
Political Instabili1y 
OPEC countries have experienced a high rate of socioeconomic change 
during the 1970s and 1980s. Such rapid change means that these countries are 
not politically stable (Kirkham et aI., 1970). Generally, every country has 
experienced some type of political instability at some point during its history. For 
example, the civil disorder in Iran was faced with government sanctions against its 
people. Furthermore, elitist governments saw the development of political 
pressures against the existing political systems. In general, the OPEC countries 
are not stable countries; their pOlitical systems are not old enough to allow for 
political adjustment to occur. Each country is socially and politically unstable until 
it achieves a high level of modernization and a pOlitical system that is satisfactory 
to the majority of the people (Taylor and Jodice. 1983). 
It is essential to this study to distinguish between a potential crisis, such 
as a war or revolution, and conditions which are less dramatic and emotional. 
Verba defined a crisis as "a change that requires some governmental innovation 
and institutionalization if elites are not seriously to risk a loss of their position or if 
the society is to survive." Political unrest, such as political violence, does not 
necessarily lead to a crisis (Zimmermann, 1983). Political instability can be defined 
in different ways, because it has so many dimensions. Feierabend and Feierabend 
(1965) defined political instability as a degree or amount of aggression that is 
directed from individuals or groups against other individuals or groups within the 
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political system. Stewart and Venieris (1985) found that political instability (riots, 
demonstrations, strikes, irregular changes of government, and death due to 
domestic political violence) negatively affected money-saving behavior in less-
developed countries. Another study found that political instability (domestic civil 
conflict and violent behavior) affected foreign investment in developing countries 
negatively (Levis, 1979). 
There is no denying the impact of a political crisis on OPEC's production 
and price activity in 1973 and 1979-1980. This can be shown in the Iran situation 
of 1979. The oil supply curve of Iran was shifted to the left in 1979 and continued 
during the Iran-Iraq war to 1981, but the question here is concerned with the 
political instability of each OPEC member, which might have an impact on OPEC's 
production decisions over time. 
Heiat (1988) measured the political influences on oil production by using 
the IIsquare root of the sum of the squared residuals of deviations from the trend 
of oil production in each of the oil-producing countries.1I dividing that IIby the 
number of observations and using the classical formula for the residual variance.1I 
Hence, Heiat's assumption was that all shifts in production from a basic time trend 
were caused by political influence. Obviously, the realities of production behavior 
are considerably more complex. Some studies used dummy variables to account 
for the effects of the oil embargo, the Iranian revolution, and the Iran-Iraq war. 
These were crisis situations. Political instability is defined in this study in terms of 
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the magnitude of internal conflicts involving the government of a particular member 
country. Therefore, political instability is measured by events that influence 
government policy (Le., demonstrations, riots, armed attacks, political strikes, and 
government sanctions) (Taylor and Jodice, 1983). Because the previous political 
measurements were intended to measure the influence of the oil embargo of 1973, 
the Iranian revolution of 1979, and the Iran-Iraq war of 1980, the new measurement 
is better suited to tracing the effect of political instability on production over time. 
A recent study based on political events as a measure of political instability 
found a negative relationship between these events and foreign direct investment. 
This study criticized previous studies for their failure to show a strong relationship 
between foreign investment and political events. The fact that they used indexes, 
based on the expert evaluation of several political events, as a measurement of 
political instability contributed to the failure of these studies. The study agreed that 
data on sociopOlitical events were the best measure of political stability, despite 
theoretical and data interpretation problems (Sedah and Safizadeh, 1988). Political 
influences were measured in this research in the form of the annual aggregate 
number of strikes, protests, riots, armed attacks, and government sanctions for 
each OPEC member. 
Social Pressure 
Alternative measures of social pressure, which are concerned more with 
the internal satisfaction of a society, can be reflected in the distributional data such 
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as land, wealth, and income per capita (Taylor and Jodice, 1983). The income 
distribution can be measured by the index of inequality of income distribution. 
This index measures the relative \"/ell-belng of a society. A larger inequality in 
income distribution would lead to greater demands and pressures on the 
government by those people who were affected by this inequality. Another 
measurement is the growth percentage rate of income per capita, which measures 
the society's needs for public services. A higher income growth rate meant less 
social pressure on tha government and more social stability, because the benefits 
were greater than the costs of violent actions. In addition. socioeconomic mobility 
(education index) and the level of population concentration (urbanization) could 
lead to a higher demand by the public, if this demand did not meet the effects of 
social pressure would develop (Parvin, 1973). The data on the previous social 
pressure measurements were not available. Therefore, the population growth rate 
was used as the measurement of social pressure. 
As the population growth rate (POP) increases in OPEC countries, it 
increases the demand for public services. A large demand leads to an increase 
in government expenditures to provide these types of services that the public 
needs. Then pressure is placed on the government to increase its oil production 
in order to increase its revenue and satisfy its people's needs. This, in turn, affects 
the stability of OPEC's oil production, assuming there is interdependence among 
OPEC's members. Also, it is expected that those countries with stable population 
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growth rates (Iraq, Ubya, Algeria, Venezuela, Indonesia, and Nigeria) and those 
with declining population growth rates (Qatar, U.A.E., and Kuwait) do not have 
social pressures to increase their oil production. On the other hand, countries with 
increasing population growth rates (Saudi Arabia and Iran) have pressures to 
increase their oil production. Overall, a high population growth rate leads to a 
higher production rate and consequent market share instability for OPEC's 
member countries. 
Excess Capacity 
The ratio of reserves to production will be utilized to measure the relative 
level of potential excess production capacity. Also, excess capacity measures the 
level of reserve concentration to production. Excess capacity exists when the 
actual value of the reserves-ta-production ratio (present, past, or future values of 
the ratio yx ) exceeds the technical limit {the lower limit of the ratio at a point of 
time, y,. Excess capacity is desirable at level Y· or when that actual value of the 
reserves-to-production ratio is less than the desired excess capacity at certain 
times, and there is no threat to cartel stability (Figure 9). 
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Figure 9. Excess capacity as a distablizing influence. 
Source: Daly et aI., 1982. 
MONETARY PRESSURE DETERMINANTS 
Exchange Rate 
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The dollar is the medium of exchange for world oil and influences the cost 
of crude oil (International Energy Outlook, 1989). Exchange rates (EX) were used 
in the cartel models as a measurement of monetary pressure. The exchange rate 
variable measures the change in the real value of the dollar relative to foreign 
currencies. A high exchange rate influences the production negatively, and a low 
exchange rate influences production positively. An increase in the exchange rate 
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increases the real price of oil and oil revenue in foreign currencies relative to U.S. 
dollars (Lowinger, et al., 1985). 
Current Account Balance 
The current account balance (CAB) represents the balance of trade, the 
services account, and gift exchanges between countries. A surplus CAB indicates 
that a country exports more than it imports and has less of a need for oil revenue. 
In this research, the CAB was scaled as a percentage of GOP. 
The CAB can be used as an indicator of the net holdings of foreign assets 
(Mattione, 1985). In addition, it measures each OPEC member's capacity to 
absorb imported goods and services on which they have spent a large proportion 
of their oil revenues (Lea, 1975), where "absorptive capacity represents an attempt 
to measure the ability of a nation to adjust spending to changes in income" 
(Mattione, 1985). 
Foreign Exchange Reserves 
The CAB does not account for the money OPEC members borrow from 
the foreign reserves. As a solution to this problem, the total offoreign exchange 
reserves (TF) minus gold was included in the target revenue model as measure 
of the latent fiscal capacity of these countries. 
Fixed Domestic Capital 
Griffin (1985) used fixed domestic investment (FC) as a measure of 
revenue needs, but some economists have been critical of this approach because 
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it failed to consider foreign investment as an alternative to domestic investment. 
Fixed domestic capital, lagged one year, was used in the target revenue model. 
MODEL SPECIFICATIONS 
The variables that Griffin (1985) used in the cartel, competitive, and target 
revenue models were included in the model specifications for this study. These 
variables are: the production of each OPEC member, the real price of oil, other 
OPEC production, lagged oil reserves, and lagged oil price. The competitive 
model was employed without modification, but it was tested for two time spans. 
Cartel Model 
This research uses a modified version of the market-sharing cartel model 
formulated by Griffin (1985). Non-economic variables, such as population growth 
rate and political instability (number of strikes, armed attacks, protests, riots, 
government sanctions) are also included (see Appendix A). Some economic 
variables (e.g., exchange rate, excess capacity, and current account balance) are 
in this model specification. 
The cartel model is expressed as follows: 
+ BSi Log POP it + BSi Log PO~ + B.,i Log -B- + Eit 
Q°it 
i = 1, ---, N; t = 1, ---, T 
Where: 
RP = 
0 00 -
EX = 
POP = 
POL = 
R = 
QO 
CAB = 
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The real oil price relative to Saudi light crude oil (deflated by 
U.S. 1982 deflator) 
Total OPEC production (0, - Individual production (OJ 
represents other OPEC members' production in MBO 
Exchange rate in U.S. dollars 
Population growth rate 
Political variables (protests, riots, armed attacks, strikes, 
government sanctions) in absolute numbers 
Reserves-to-production ratio (RIO) 
Current account balance as percentage of GOP in millions of 
U.s. dollars 
The market-sharing hypotheses are tested. Market-sharing hypotheses 
of 0 00 depend on the real oil price's behavior. If the 0 00 coefficient is constant 
and the real oil price's coefficient is not significant (B4 = 1, B1 = 0), then OPEC 
has constant market-sharing. But if the 0 00 coefficient is constant and the price's 
coefficient is Significant (B4 = 1, B1 ~ 0). then the market-sharing hypothesis is 
accepted for OPEC members. Furthermore, if the 0 00 coefficient is significant and 
greater than zero, while the price coefficient is significant (B4 > 1, B1 ~ 0), then the 
partial market-sharing hypothesis is accepted and OPEC is not a fully effective 
cartel. 
--- -------------------------------
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The stability of OPEC's market share is influenced by the change in EX, 
POP, POL, CAB, and A/a. A higher EX, POL instability, a deficit in the CAB, and 
a higher R/Q affects OPEC's production negatively, whereas a higher POP leads 
to an increase in OPEC's production. 
Competitive Model 
The competitive model's specification was the same as Griffin's (1985) 
specification, except that this specification used the real crude oil price of OPEC 
members relative to Saudi's light crude oil to avoid the problem of crude oil price 
differentiation. The competitive model is specified as follows: 
Log 0it = ai + Bli Log APit + B2i Log Ait + B3i Log APit_1 + B4i Log Ait_1 + 
Eit 
i = 1, --, N; t = 1, ---, T 
R The proven oil reserves in billions of barrels annually, 
as of January 1 
The relative crude oil price, lagged one period 
The proven oil reserves, lagged one period 
In a competitive market, all oil producers are price takers, so an increase 
in the oil prices leads producers to expand their output and sell as much as they 
can_ Therefore, competitive oil producers produce more when the oil prices are 
higher (+81> and vice versa. But if an increase in oil prices results in a cut in oil 
production (-B1) by some producers, then these producers are not behaving as 
competitive producers. 
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Target Revenue Model 
Griffin (1985) used real fixed domestic capital formation in billions of dollars 
(GFC) as a proxy of investment needs. This study used GFC and the CAB as a 
percentage of GDP to measure revenue needs. This is important, because a 
surplus in the CAB indicates that the country does not need more revenue from 
the sale of oil; conversely, a deficit in the CAB indicates that the country requires 
more oil revenues to finance its needs. 
The target revenue model is expressed as follows: 
Log 0it = ai + B1i Log RPit + B2i Log GFCit•1 + B3i Log CABit_1 + B4i Log 
TFit_1 + Eit 
i = 1, ---, N; t = 1, ---, T 
CAB represents investment needs and TR represents the value of foreign 
reserves minus the value of gold reserves in billions of dollars. If the coefficients 
B3 and B4 are constant and there is an increase in the oil price, the production 
should be decreased proportionately (B1 = -1); if there is an increase in 
investment needs, ceteris paribus, the production should be increased 
proportionately (B2 = 1). Also, the tests were performed for the coefficient (B2 > 
0, B1 < 0), to determine the influence of revenue needs on production level. The 
coefficient of TR measures the need for withdrawing cash from reserves, which 
indicates that the country should increase its production. 
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Griffin (1985) specified the property rights model as follows: 
i = 1, --, N; t = 1, -, T 
Git is a percentage of government-controlled production, measured by the 
government's percentage of oil equity. In this model, Gjt was measured by the 
calculated ratio of the parent company's estimated gross share of crude oil 
production for each OPEC member country to the total production of the same 
country. This is synonymous with government equity oil, which Griffin used. 
OPERA TIONALIZATION 
Multiple-regression estimation techniques were used to operationalize 
these four econometric models. The data were transformed using double log 
format, except for the property rights mode\. For these models, the data were 
analyzed for two time periods: 1971-1982 and 1983-1987. Because of the 
limitations of the data in terms of the limited number of observations, the Chow-test 
was used to determine whether or not there was a shift in OPEC's production 
behavior between the two study periods (Maddala, 1977). 
To test the homogeneity of the four models' coefficients, the following 
alternative pooling models were used: least squares with dummy variables 
(LSDV), seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR), and cross-sectional correlated 
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and time-wise auto-regression (CCTA) (Kmenta, 1986). The last two models 
assumed that the disturbance error was stochastic. 
DATA COLLECTION 
The empirical analysis was based on annual data that covered the 1971-
1987 period. Data for all the variables used were available for all 11 members of 
the cartel, excluding Gabon and Ecuador. As in most cases, the collection of data 
was not an easy task. Information on the official selling prices, OPEC production, 
and reserves was obtained from Basic Petroleum Data Book (1989). This 
information was supported by OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin (1973-1987). 
Saudi's light oil (34°) price was used as the base price for all countries for 
1971 (PS1). The relative oil prices of other OPEC members to Saudi's oil price 
(RP) from 1972-1987 was calculated by the following formula: 
RP for the 1972-1987 period = Ps2t + Px2it - Ps2t 
Ps1 
Where Ps1 = Pxi is the same for all countries in 1971 (the base year). 
Ps2t = Saudi's real price for the second year; t = 1972, ---, 1987. 
Px2it = individual country's real oil price for the second year; i = 2, ---, 11; and t 
= 1972, ---.1987. 
World consumption, excluding that of communist countries, from 1971 to 1985 was 
obtained from Annual Energy Review (1987); the data for 1986-1987 was obtained 
from International Energy Outlook (1989). Population and the parent companies' 
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estimated gross share' of crude oil production were obtained from OPEC Annual 
Statistics Bulletin (1973-1987). All data on the GOP, foreign reserves, the CAB, the 
exchange rate, the U.S. (1982) deflator rate, and gross domestic fixed capital 
formation were obtained from International Financial Statistics (1989). The political 
variables (number of strikes, protests, riots, armed attacks, and government 
sanctions) for 1971-1982 were obtained from the World Handbook of Political and 
Social Indicators (Taylor and Jodice, 1983). The data for the same political 
variables from 1983 to 1987 were coded according to the previous source. To 
make this new coding comparable to the previous coding of the World Handbook 
of Political and Social Indicators, the same definitions of political events were used 
(Taylor and Jodice, 1983). Political events did not include criminal activities or any 
economic actions (see Appendix A). Two approaches were used to identify the 
political events: geographic (country name) and subheading (university and 
bombs) approaches. The primary source used was The New York Times Index 
(1983-1987) in which the political events are available annually. Other secondary 
sources used were The Middle East Journal (1983-1987), and Keesing's Record 
of World Events (1983-1987). 
CHAPTER V 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
POOLED MODELS 
Different alternative pooling techniques were used in this study in order to 
satisfy the degree-of-freedom requirement. The cartel, competitive, and target 
revenue models had at least five independent variables with twelve observations 
(N1) in the first period (1971-1982) and five observations (N2) in the second period 
(1983-1987). The first alternative was to use the Chow-test to test for a structural 
shift in OPEC's production behavior between the 1971-1982 and 1983-1987 
periods. The second period had few observations and a large number of variables 
in individual countries' models (K > N2). Therefore, each individual OPEC 
member's cartel, competitive, and target revenue models were estimated for the 
1971-1982 and 1971-1987 periods. Then the difference between the residual sum 
of squares for the two periods for each individual member's regression model was 
calculated according to the Chow-test formula, which used an F-test to test for the 
level of significance (Maddala, 1977). Calculated F-tests were compared to the 
critical value of the F-test at a 5-percent level. All of the calculated F-tests were not 
significant at a 5-percent level. and there was no structural shift in OPEC's 
production behavior for the three models (the results of the Chow-test are shown 
-- ----- -- ------- ---------
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in Tables II-IV). Therefore, the two periods were combined. The analysis then 
proceeded for the entire 1971-1987 period. 
The Chow-test was not used for the property rights model, because it was 
used only for the 1971-1982 period. Since the reliability of the model decreased 
while the number of variables increased and the number of observations 
decreased, the decision was made to use other pooling techniques to pool the 
data and to compare each individual regression coefficient with the chosen pooled 
model for all the 11 OPEC members (excluding Ecuador and Gabon) for the 1971-
1987 period. Consequently, the pooled time-series cross-sectional data increased 
the sample size and the reliability of the regression coefficients. The decision to 
pool the data also took into consideration the inappropriateness of pooling due to 
aggregation bias, because this pooling could have affected the interpretation of 
the parameters. Therefore, ordinary least squares with dummy variables (LSDV) 
was estimated for different intercepts and slopes (this is equivalent to estimating 
each individual country's regression). Also, the LSDV was estimated for the 
following hypotheses. 
The inter-country homogeneity hypotheses were tested, and the three 
hypotheses were as follows: 
1. A common intercept and common slope (H1). 
2. A common slope and different intercepts (H2). It is referred to as 
least squares with dummy variables (LSDV). 
3. A common intercept and different slopes (H:J. 
65 
TABLE II 
CHOW-TEST RESULTS OF THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN 1971-1982 AND 1983-
1987 PERIODS FOR THE CARTEL MODELA 
SAUDI 
IRAN 
IRAQ 
VENEZUELA 
QATAR 
LIBYA 
INDONESIA 
U.A.E. 
ALGERIA 
NIGERIA 
KUWAIT 
.052 
.050 
.011 
.004 
.012 
.024 
.0132 
.0185 
.0147 
.009 
.033 
.023 
.021 
.002 
.001 
.002 
.011 
.002 
.006 
.009 
.005 
.007 
(RSS - RSS1)/N2 
5 4 
... = 
= ... 
... = 
... = 
= = 
= = 
... = 
... = 
... ... 
... ... 
1 
2.22 
4.22 
3 
6 
4 
5.82 
1.25 
.57 
.58 
5.56 
A) CHOW-TEST'" -------- = COMPUTED F (MAnDALA, 1977). 
RSSl / (Nl-8) 
B) RSS = RESIDUAL SUM OF SQUARES OF THE INDIVIDUAL COUNTRY FOR 
THE CARTEL MODEL OVER THE 1971-1987 PERIOD (Nl + N2 ... 17). 
C) RSSl ... RESIDUAL SUM OF SQUARES OF THE INDIVIDUAL COUNTRY FOR 
THE CARTEL MODEL OVER THE 1971-1982 PERIOD (Nl'" 12). 
D) DF (DEGREE OF FREEDOM) ... NUMBER OF 0BSERVATIONS IN THE 
1983-1987 PERIOD (N2 ... 5 BECAUSE k+l > N2). 
E) DFl (DEGREE OF FREEDOM) ... NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS IN THE 
1971-1982 PERIOD MINOS NUMBER OF VARIABLES ~LOS THE CONSTANT 
(Nl - 8 ... 4). 
F) COMPtI"TED F (Fe) COMPARED TO (.'RITICAL VALUE OF F (5,4) = 6.26 AT 
5% LEVEL. 
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TABLE III 
CHOW-TEST RESULTS OF THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN 1971-1982 AND 1983-1987 
PERIODS FOR THE COMPETITIVE MODELA 
RSSB RSSC Dt> DF1E FcF 
SAUDI .105 .055 5 7 1 
IRAN .1564 .146 = = .10 
IRAQ .1743 .1696 = = .05 
VENEZUELA .0194 •• 0139 = = 1 
QATAR .0391 .01391 = = 1 
LIBYA .1363 .0775 = = 1 
INDONESIA .0324 .023 = = .60 
U.A.E. .0237 .0205 = = .21 
ALGERIA .0200 .184 = = 1 
NIGERIA .032 .028 = = .20 
KUWAIT .083 .054 = = 1 
(RSS - RSS1)/N2 
A) CHOW-TEST = = COMPUTED F (MADDALA, 1977) 
RSS1· / (N1-5) 
B) RSS = RESIDUAL SUM OF SQUARES OF THE INDIVIDUAL COUNTRY FOR THE 
CARTEL MODEL OVER THE 1971-1987 PERIOD (N1 + N2 = 17). 
C} RSS1 = RESIDUAL SUM OF SQUARES OF THE INDIVIDUAL COUNTRY FOR THE 
CARTEL MODEL OVER THE 1971-1982 PERIOD (N1 = 12). 
D} OF (DEGREE OF FREEDOM) = NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS IN THE 1983-1987 
PERIOD (N2 = 5 BECAUSE k+l > N2). 
E) DF1 (DEGREE OF FREEDOM) = NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS IN THE 1971-1982 
PERIOD MINUS NUMBER OF VARIABLES PLUS THE CONSTANT (Nl - 5 = 7). 
F) COMPUTED F(Fc) COMPARED TO THE CRITICAL VALUE OF F(5,7) = 3.97 
AT 5% LEVEL. 
TABLE IV 
CHOW-TEST RESULTS OF THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN 1971-1982 AND 
1983-1987 PERIODS FOR THE TARGET REVENUE MODELA 
COUNTRY RSSB RSS1C Dt> DF1E FcF 
SAUDI .09 .080 7 5 3 
VENEZUELA .0058 .143 = = 1.5 
KUWAIT .027 .069 = = 1 
INDONESIA .018 .034 = = .33 
ALGERIA .044 .0374 = = 1 
NIGERIA .031 35 = = .50 
(RSS - RSS1)/N2 
A) CHOW-TEST = = COMPUTED F (MADDALA, 1977). 
RSSl / (Nl-5) 
B) RSS = RESIDUAL SUM OF SQUARES OF THE INDIVIDUAL COUNTRY FOR 
THE CARTEL MODEL OVER THE 1971-1987 PERIOD (Nl + N2 = 17). 
C) RSSl = RESIDUAL SUM OF SQUARES OF THE INDIVIDUAL COUNTRY FOR 
THE CARTEL MODEL OVER THE 1971-1982 PERIOD (Nl = 12). 
D) DF (DEGREE OF FREEDOM) = NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS IN THE 1983-
1987 PERIOD (N2 = 5 BECAUSE k+l > N2). 
E) DFl (DEGREE OF FREEDOM) = NUMBER OF OBSERVATION IN THE 1971-
1982 PERIOD MINUS NUMBER OF VARIABLES PLUS THE CONSTANT (N1 - 5 = 
7). 
F) COMPUTED F(Fc) COMPARED TO THE CRITICAL VALUE OF F(7,5) = 3.97 
AT 5% LEVEL. 
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These hypotheses were tested using an F-test to determine whether the 
total residual sum of squares of all estimated regressions differed from the residual 
sum of squares of each hypothesis (Maddala, 19n). 
The estimate of the cartel model with LSDV was not straightforward. The 
cartel model had too many variables to perform the LSDV on the entire data; 
instead, the cartel model was divided into three groups, following Eckbo's (1979) 
grouping. The first group consisted of the core countries; the second group 
consisted of the price-pusher countries; the third group consisted of the 
expansionist countries. Also, this type of grouping was useful for determining 
whether non-economic factors would change the common view of these groups' 
behavior. 
For the core countries, H, and H2 were rejected, but H3 (the common 
intercept and different slopes hypothesis) was accepted. The pooling was 
appropriate for these countries, but Hs was not the most efficient method for 
pooling data (Table V). For the price-pusher countriess, H1 was rejected but H2 
and H3 were accepted. Therefore, the data pooled in two different ways: common 
slope and different intercepts or common intercept and different slopes (Table VI). 
The only hypothesis accepted for the expansionist countries was H3 (Table VII). 
Also, LSDV was utilized to test the homogeneity of the competitive 
coefficients. H2 and H3 were accepted, and the pooling was justified (Table VIII). 
For the target revenue and property rights models, all the hypotheses of 
homogeneity of the coefficients were rejected, and the pooling was not appropriate 
TABLE V 
HYPOTHESES TESTING OF '!'HE LSDV RSULTS FOR THE CORE 
COUNTRIES (CARTEL) FOR 1971-19S7A 
DIFFERENT INTERCEPTS & SLOPES (H) SB= .13 
COMMON INTERCEPT & SLOPE (U1) SlB= 2.13 
COMMON SLOPE & DIFFERENT INTERCEPTS (H2) S2B= .505 
COMMON INTERCEPT & DIFFERENT SLOPES (H3) S3B=.131S 
COMPUTED Fec CRITICAL F (AT 5%) IF Fe > Ft 
OF = 45 
DF = 77 
DF = 73 
DF = 49 
H1 F1 20.S3 F1(DF=32,45) = 1.79 REJECTED 
H2 F2 3.33 F2(DF=28,45) = 1.87 REJECTED 
H3 F3 .67 F3(DF=4,45) - 5.72 ACCEPTED 
A) LSDV = LEAST SQUARES WITH DUMMY VARIABLES. 
B) S •••• S3 = INDIVIDUAL RESIDUAL SUM OF SQUARES OF THE CORE 
MODEL FOR EACH HYPOTHESIS (H ••••• H3) FOR 1971-1987. 
(Sl - S)/ (77 - 45) 
C) F1=---------
S/45 
(S2 - S)/ (73 - 45) 
F2=-----------------
S/45 
(S3 - S)/ (49 - 45) 
F3=----------------- (MADDALA, 1977). 
S/45 
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TABLE VI 
HYPOTHESES TESTING OF THE LSDV RESULTS FOR THE PRICE-PUSHER 
COUNTRIES (CARTEL) FOR 1971-1987A 
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DIFFERENT INTERCEPTS & SLOPES SB= .083 DF = 27 
COMMON INTERCEPT & SLOPE (H1) SlB= .921 DF = 43 
COMMON SLOPE & DIFFERENT INTERCEPTS (H2) S2B= .160 DF = 41 
COMMON INTERCEPT & DIFFERENT SLOPES (H3) S3B= .056 DF = 29 
COMPUTED FCC CRITICAL F (AT 5%) IF Fc > Ft 
H1 F1 = 17.45 F1(DF=16,27)= 2.2 REJECTED 
H2 F2 = 1.83 F2(DF=14,27)= 2.35 ACCEPTED 
H3 F3 = 4.50 F3(DF=2,27) = 19.5 ACCEPTED 
A) LSDV = LEAST SQUARES WITH DUMMY VARIABLES. 
B) S •••• S3 = INDIVIDUAL RESIDUAL SUM OF SQUARES OF THE PRICE-
PUSHER MODEL FOR EACH HYPOTHESIS (Hl •••• H3) FOR 1971-1987. 
(Sl - S)/ (43 - 27) 
C) F1 = ------------------
F2 = 
F3 = 
5/27 
(52 - 5)/ (41 - 27) 
S/27 
(S3 - 5)/. (29 - 27) 
5/27 
. (MADDALA, 1977). 
TABLE VII 
HYPOTHESES TESTING OF THE LSDV RESULTS FOR THE EXPANSIONIST 
COUNTRIES (CARTEL) FOR 1971-1987 
DIFFERENT INTERCEPTS , SLOPES SB = .025 OF == 27 
COMMON INTERCEPT & SLOPE (H1) S1B= .1389 OF = 43 
COMMON SLOPE & DIFFERENT INTERCEPTS (H2) S28= .116 OF = 41 
COMMON INTERCEPT , DIFFERENT SLOPES (H3) S38= .0279 OF = 29 
COMPUTED FcC CRITICAL Ft Fe > Ft 
HI F1 = 7.22 Fl(DF=16,27) = 2.24 REJECTED 
H2 F2 = 4.91 F2 (DF=14, 27) = 2.35 REJECTED 
H3 F3 = 1.61 F3(DF=2,27) = 19.5 ACCEPTED 
A) LSDV = LEAST SQUARES WITH DUMMY VARIABLES. 
B) S •••• S3 = INDIVIDUAL RESIDUAL SUM OF SQUARES OF THE 
EXPANSIONIST MODEL FOR EACH HYPOTHESIS (H1 •••• H3) FOR 1971-1987. 
(S1 - S)/ (43 - 27) 
C) -F1 = ---------
F2 = 
S/27 
(S2 - S)/ (41 - 27) 
S/27 
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F3 = 
(S3 - S)/ (29 - 27) 
S/27 
(MADDALA, 1977). 
TABLE VIII 
HYPOTHESES TESTING OF THE LSDV RESULTS FOR THE COMPETITIVE 
MODEL FOR 1971-1987A 
DIFFERENT INTERCEPTS &: SLOPES SB,. .98 DF ... 154 
COMMON INTERCEPT , SLOPE (Hl) SIB"" 2.36 DF .. 184 
COMMON SLOPE &: DIFFERENT INTERCEPTS (H2) S2B ... 1.14 DF lIZ 174 
COMMON INTERCEPT &: DIFFERENT SLOPES (H3) S3B_ 1.06 DF ... 164 
H1 
82 
H3 
COMPUTED FCC CRITICAL F (AT 5') Fe > Ft 
Fl ... 5 F1 (DF-30, 154) .. 1.62 REJECTED 
F2 .. 1 F2(DF""20,154) .. 1.84 ACCEPTED 
F3 ... 1 F3(DF==10,154) .. 2.54 ACCEPTED 
A) LSDV ... LEAST SQUARES WITH DtJMKY VARIABLES. 
B) s .... S3 .. INDIVIDUAL SUM OF SQUARES OF THE COMPETITIVE 
KODEL FOR EACH HYPOTHESIS (H1 •••• H3) FOR 1971-1987. 
(S1 - S)/ (184 - 154) 
C) F1 .. --------
F2 .. 
F3 .. 
S/154 
(S2 - 5)/ (174 - 154) 
S/154 
(53 - S)/ (164 - 154) 
S/154 
(MADDALA, 1977). 
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(Tables IX and X). lSDV was used to test for the homogeneity of the regression 
coefficient, but the data could be pooled according to the disturbance behavior. 
Seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) assumes that the disturbance is 
stochastic; SUR is more efficient than OlS. if a researcher believes that there is a 
high correlation between the cross-sectional unit's residuals and not over time. 
This model was tested by estimating each cross-sectional residual and then 
analyzing the correlation matrix between the cross-sectional unit's residuals. There 
was a correlation between the cross-sectional unit's residuals although it was not 
high. 
After different pooling models were reviewed as alternatives, the decision 
was made to use the SUR model, because it could not cause any loss in the 
degree of freedom and it could give aggregate and disaggregate estimates of 
regression models. This model was found not to be efficient, because the 
correlation between the cross-sectional units of the residuals was not high enough 
to increase the reliability of the coefficients. Another technique utilized was cross-
sectional correlated and time-wise auto-regressive model (CCTA). This was an 
appropriate model to use for estimating pooled data. This model assumed that 
there was heteroskedasticity and a mutual correlation between cross-sectional 
units and auto-regressive over the time-series units. Also, it was assumed that the 
disturbance error was randomly distributed. Kmenta (1986) suggested that CCTA 
was appropriate if the units of analysis were regions or countries; for example, 
OPEC countries are located in certain regions, and they are developing countries 
that correlate culturally and ethnically (Danielson, 1988). The CCTA model was 
- ---- ------------------------
TABLE IX 
HYPOTHESES TESTING OF THE LSDV RESULTS FOR THE TARGET 
REVENUE MODEL FOR 1971-1987 
DIFFERENT INTERCEPTS & SLOPES SB= .214 DF = 66 
COMMON INTERCEPT & SLOPE (Hl) SlB= .591 DF = 91 
COMMON SLOPE & DIFFERENT INTERCEPTS (H2) S2B= .349 DF = 86 
COMMON INTERCEPT & DIFFERENT SLOPES (H3) S3B= .284 DF = 71 
COMPUTED FCC CRITICAL F (AT 5%) Fc > Ft 
Hi Fl = 5.03 Fl(DF=25,66) = 1.82 REJECTED 
H2 F2 = 2.26 F2(DF=20,66) = 1.95 REJECTED 
H3 F3 = 9.27 F3(DF=5,66) = 4.43 REJECTED 
A) LSDV = LEAST SQUARES WITH DUMMY VARIABLES. 
B) S •••• S3 = INDIVIDUAL RESIDUAL SUM OF SQUARES OF THE TARGET 
REVENUE MODEL FOR EACH HYPOTHESIS (Hl •••• H3) FOR 1971-1987. 
(Sl - S)/ (91 - 66) 
C) Fl = ---------
F2 = 
S/66 
(S2 - S)/ (86 - 66) 
S/66 
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F3 = 
(S3 - S)/ (71 - 66) 
S/66 
(MADDALA, 1977). 
TABLE X 
HYPOTHESES TESTING OF THE LSDV RESULTS FOR THE PROPERTY 
RIGHTS MODEL FOR 1971-1982A 
DIFFERENT INTERCEPTS & SLOPES SB = .24 DF = 78 
COMMON INTERCEPT & SLOPE (Hl) SlB= 42.78 DF = 94 
COMMON SLOPE & DIFFERENT INTERCEPTS (H2) S2B= 34.92 DF = 87 
COMMON INTERCEPT & DIFFERENT SLOPES (H3) S3B= -2720 DF = 87 
COMPUTED FeC CRITICAL Ft Fe > Ft 
Hl Fl = 886.25 Fl(DF=16,78) ... 2.11 REJECTED 
H2 F2 = 1284.44 F2(DF=9,78) 
- 3.01 REJECTED 
H3 F3 11& 1260.56 F3(DF=9,78) 0:: 3.01 REJECTED 
A) LSDV 0:: LEAST SQUARES WITH DUMMY VARIABLES. 
B) S •••• S3 ... DlDIVIDUAL RESIDUAL SUM OF SQUARES OF '!'HE PROPERTY 
RIGHTS MODEL FOR EACH HYPOTHESIS (Hl •••• R3) FOR ~971-1982. 
(51 - 5)/ (94 - 78) 
C) Fl = 
F2 0:: 
F3 ... 
- --- --------_._---------
S/78 
(52 - S)/ (87 - 78) 
S/78 
(S3 - 5)/ (87 - 78) 
S/78 
(MADDALA, 1977). 
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found to be efficient for pooling the data. Overall, comparing alternative pooling 
models provided more accurate and efficient estimates than just using a single 
pooling mode\. 
CARTEL MODEL 
Because of its efficiency, the CCTA model was selected to pool the data 
for the cartel model. The data were stacked into diagonal blocks of cells, with 
each block containing only the records of each country. The number of armed 
attacks was selected to represent the internal political instability of OPEC countries. 
It seemed that the data reported in this variable was more accurate and that the 
number of armed attacks was the only significant political variable. The estimated 
pooled model for 11 OPEC members (excluding Ecuador and Gabon) for the 
1971-1987 period is thus shown below with standard errors in parentheses: 
Log 0it = 2.18 - .06 Log RP it + .04 Log EXit + .16 Log CABit 
(.30) (.01) (.01) (.02) 
+ .41 Log Qooit - .26 Log POPit - .001 Log ATTit - .16 Log R 
Q°it 
(.05) (.17) (.001) (.02) '. 
Buse ~ = .75 (see Appendix A) N = 187 
The coefficient of other OPEC countries' production was significant and 
positive. Furthermore, the price coefficient was significant and negative. The 
negative price coefficient could be explained by the fact that OPEC varied its 
market share according to its oil prices and was willing to sacrifice some of its 
market share in order to keep the price at a high level. Therefore, the constant 
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market-sharing hypothesis (84 = 1, 81 = 0) and the market~sharing hypothesis. 
(84 = 1, B1 > 0) were rejected. OPEC partially shared the oil market; this led to 
the acceptance of the partial market-sharing hypothesis (84 > 0, 81 > 0). The 
partial-sharing hypothesis indicated that OPEC was a cartel but that it was not fully 
effective. Ineffective coordination of price and production quotas suggested that 
OPEC had internal disputes over which price and output best served each 
country's interest. To control other factors that could explain these different 
interests and the OPEC market share stability. additional economic and 
sociopolitical variables were included in the model. It was expected that the 
exchange rate, which measures the value of dollars to foreign currency, would 
affect OPEC's production negatively. The coefficient of the exchange rate was 
significant. and it had a positive effect on OPEC's production. The decline in value 
of the dollar in 1985 might have contributed to the change in this coefficient. 
The CAB was introduced into the model as a proxy to denote the wealth 
of each country. In the 1980s, most of the OPEC countries experienced deficits 
in their current accounts. The deficits could have been reduced if the production 
had been increased to a reasonable level. This meant that a decrease in the CAB 
deficit could have led to an increase in the production level and consequently an 
increase in oil revenue. It was thus anticipated that the sign of the CAB coefficient 
would be. negative. However. the coefficient of the OPEC CAB was positive and 
significant. The positive sign of the CAB might have been caused by the 
simultaneous problem between OPEC's production and the CAB. Therefore, the 
CA8 lagged one period, but this lag did not solve the problem. Another attempt 
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to solve the simultaneous problem was not to use CAB. However, the result was 
not satisfactory; therefore, the final decision was to leave the CAB and keep the 
original specification of the model. Furthermore, the effect of the CAB deficit was 
. not negative on the production that might have contributed to the sharp increase 
in OPEC's real prices through the period of 1979-1982. This price increase 
created surpluses in OPEC's CAB during the same period, while there was a 
deficit during the 1982-1987 period. Borrowing from the foreign reserve could not 
be ruled out, because it eased the pressure on increasing production. Also, large-
scale economic development projects were completed in the 1980s in some OPEC 
countries, such as Saudi Arabia. Furthermore, there were surpluses in the CABs 
of Kuwait, U.A.E., and Qatar through the period of the analysis; these surpluses 
might have offset the effect of the increased production in the pooled model. 
It was hypothesized that the political and social variables would have an 
impact on OPEC's production. The armed attacks and the population growth rate 
were representative of political instability and social pressure, respectively. The 
population growth was expected to be positive, but it turned out to be negative 
and not significant. The political variable was expected to be negative, because 
political instability could disrupt production and consequently could create 
uncertainty about the future. It was not significant at 5 percent, but it was 
significant at 10 percent, and the coefficient was (-.001). 
The coefficient of the reserves-to-production ratio as a measure of excess 
capacity was a negative and significant factor, which reflected the fact that OPEC's 
production decreased and the reserves-to-production ratio increased through the 
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1980s, except for the 1986 period, when OPEC's production increased and the 
reserves-to-production ratio decreased at the same time. Thus, the excess 
. capacity was a result of the cartel's behavior of restricting its output. In a 
competitive market, the coefficient would have been expected to be positive. 
The pooled model suggested that OPEC behaved as a loose cartel. The 
model gave a picture of OPEC's behavior as a whole, but it did not explain each 
individual member's behavior; so it was very important to analyze each individual 
member's market share behavior based on the estimate of each individual 
member's regression for the 1971-1987 period. The regressions of the individual 
member countries offered very detailed information about the countries' production 
behavior, even though the coefficients' estimates were less reliable than that in the 
pooled model. Therefore, each individual regression was compared with the 
pooled model. Table XI shows the results of the 11 countries' regressions. 
The Saudi Arabian model showed the oil price coefficient to be positive 
and insignificant. The coefficient for other OPEC production was significant and 
positive. The elasticity of this coefficient was 1.06, which indicated that Saudi 
Arabia's market share was constant and its production was very sensitive to other 
OPEC production. When the Saudi model was compared with the pooled model, 
the results suggested that Saudi Arabia was willing to reduce its market share for 
a higher oil price. Therefore, it appeared that Saudi Arabia's behavior ranged from 
constant market-sharing to partial market-sharing. Also, Saudi Arabia's coefficient 
of the reserves-to-production ratio was negative and significant. This finding 
indicated that Saudi Arabia had reduced its production by 50 percent; this 
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TABLE XI 
POOLED MODEL (CCTA) AND CARTEL RESULTS FOR 11 OPEC MEMBERS FOR 
1971-1987A 
LOGRP LOGEX LOGCAB LOGQOO LOGPOP LOGATT LOGR/QO R2 
CCTA18 -.06* .04* .16* .41* -.26 -.001** -.16* 
(.Ol)e ( .01) (.02) (.05) ( .17) (.001) (. O~,> 
SAUDI .16 .91 -.01 1.06* -.25 .01 -.49* .90 
( .20) (1.37) ( .14) ( .30) (1.15) ( .01) (.22) 
IRAN -.16 1.69* .25 .60 2.12 -.001 -.71* .93 
( .17) ( .44) (.37) ( .31) (4.02) (.001) ( .21) 
IRAQ -.17 1.56 .39* 1.01* -3.5 .001 -.30 .94 
( .13) (1.69) ( .15) ( .12) (2.9) (.004) ( .10) 
KUWAIT -.40* .01 .36 .78* -.05 .03 .02 .96 
( .14) ( .33) ( .23) ( .23) (2.45) ( .02) ( .18) 
VENEZUELA -.10* -.11 .08 -.02 85.29 -.004 -.49* .98 
(.03) ( .06) ( .05) ( .06) (344) (.004) ( .04) 
QATAR -.08 -.13 .14 .70* -.09 -.02 -.20 .86 
(.07) ( .21) ( .10) ( .13) ( .45) ( .13) (.13) 
LIBYA -.24* 1.44 .16 .79* -.33 -.02 -.004 .94 
(.07) ( .92) ( .13) ( .06) (.86) ( .01) (.03) 
INDONESIA .05 -.03 -.14 .78* .17 -.01 -.13 .95 
(.04) ( .22) (.37) ( .12) (.61) ( .01) ( .13) 
U.A.E. .16* -.13* -.19 1.04* -.88 -.01 -.30* .91 
(.05) ( .04) ( .14) ( .11) (.57) ( .02) ( .14) 
ALGERIA -.08 .09 -.26 •. 74* -.001 .01 -.09 .96 
(.09) ( .10) ( .22) ( .05) (1.26) (.04) (.04) 
NIGERIA .14* .01 .07 .51* 110* .004 -.66* .97 
( .06) ( .07) ( .19) ( .08) (34.88) (.004) ( .13) 
* SIGNIFICANT AT 5% LEVEL. ** SIGNIFICANT AT 10% LEVEL. 
A) CCTA IS CROSS-SECTIONAL CORRELATED AND TIME-WISE AUTO-
REGRESSIVE MODEL. 
B) BUSE R2 = .75. 
C) STANDARD ERRORS ARE IN PARENTHESES. 
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reduction had led to a 1-percent increase in its excess capacity. It was true that 
Saudi Arabia cut its production 50 percent or more after 1982. 
Because the other OPEC production coefficient was positive in Saudi 
Arabia's cartel model, it did not act as a dominant producer in varying its 
production inversely to other OPEC production. But this analysis was extended 
to test whether Saudi Arabia in the 1980s acted as a world oil market 
clearinghouse in order to stabilize the world's oil prices, applying the AI-Sahlawi 
(1986) model of Saudi Arabia's oil supply. Thus, Saudi Arabia's production (OS) 
was regressed on its real oil price deflated by the U.S. GOP 1982 deflator, on non-
OPEC production (P" and on OPEC production excluding Saudi Arabia's 
production (0°°) for the 1971-1987 period; the model's results, with the standard 
errors in parentheses, are shown below: 
Log OSt = .02 + .17 Log RPt - -.197 Log pOt + 1.00 Log OOOt 
(.04) (.13) (.48) (.44) 
~=.92 
The real oil price coefficient was positive and significant. The coefficient 
of other OPEC production was positive and significant, which indicated that Saudi 
Arabia was not acting as a dominant producer from 1971 to 1987; otherwise, it 
would have varied its production inversely to other OPEC production (Figure 10). 
The coefficient of non-OPEC production was negative, but it was not significant. 
This meant that Saudi Arabia acted as a dominant producer in the world oil 
market, but that it did not cut its production significantly over the long range of 17 
years. 
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Figure 10. Saudi production (QS) and total OPEC production (TQO-
QS) excluding Saudi production for 1971-1987. 
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The OPEC literature indicated that Saudi Arabia acted as a stabilizer in the 
world oil market from 1981 to 1985 (AI-Sahlawi, 1986). The Chow-test was 
performed to identify when Saudi Arabia changed its role. It was found that the 
shift occurred between the 1971-1980 and 1981-1987 periods. The 1971-1987 
period was divided into the two periods of 1971-1980 and 1981-1987. The model's 
result for the 1971-1980 period is shown below. with standard errors in 
parentheses: 
Log QtS = -7.29 + .21 Log RPt + 1.31 Log pOt + 1.26 Log QOOt 
(2.8) (.04) (.40) (.39) 
~ = .86 
If Saudi Arabia acted as a dominant producer in the world oil market. then 
the coefficient of po would have been negative and significant; a sign of Qoo 
would have also indicated that Saudi Arabia was a dominant producer within 
OPEC. The other OPEC and non-OPEC production coefficients for the 1971-1980 
period were positive and significant. and they indicated that Saudi Arabia did not 
act as a dominant producer in either market. The dominant-producer theory for 
Saudi Arabia was rejected in an economic sense; but the model did not consider ' 
the political factors' influence on OPEC's production decisions despite the fact that 
the OPEC organization is a political as weil as an economic one. 
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The test for the 1981-1987 period is shown below, with the standard errors 
in parentheses: 
Log ~S = 1.67 + .22 Log RPt - 4.51 Log pOt + 5.18 Log Qoot 
(3.9) (.12) (.32) (.78) 
R2 = .98 
This result showed that Saudi Arabia was a dominant producer in the 
world oil market and that it varied its oil production inversely to non-OPEC 
production during the 1981-1987 period, because the po coefficient was significant 
and negative (Figure 11). But the other OPEC production coefficient (Qo, was 
positive and significant, which rejected the dominant-producer model of Saudi 
Arabia in the same way that the previous model did. Saudi Arabia met the first 
condition of being a dominant producer, because it has the highest proven oil 
reserve in the world with a very high production capacity. The second condition, 
the action of Saudi Arabia that determined its position as a leader in the oil market, 
was rejected by OPEC producers. At the end of i 985, Saudi Arabia abandoned 
its role as residual supplier because non-OPEC production increased and some 
OPEC members violated their quotas (Mead, 1986). 
Kuwait's and Ubya's price coefficients were negative and Significant, 
whereas other OPEC production coefficients were positive and significant. The 
reserves-to-production ratio coefficients were not significant, and this finding 
suggested that those countries were sacrificing their market shares for higher 
prices. The partial market-sharing hypothesis was accepted for these two 
countries. In Venezuela's model, the only coefficient that was significant was the 
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reserves-to-production ratio and it was negative. in general, this country's 
behavior was consistent with the general view of the price-pusher group. 
Indonesia's and Nigeria's models showed that the prices and other OPEC 
production coefficients were positive and significant. Also, their reserves-to-
production ratios were negative and significant. Nigerian population growth was 
positive and significant, indicating the need for more oil production to generate 
more revenues. The partial market-sharing hypothesis could not be rejected, and 
this is consistent with the expansionist's output behavior. 
U.A.E.'s coefficient of other OPEC countries' production was unitary and 
significant, while its price was positive and significant. The exchange rate 
coefficient was negative and significant. Its reserves-to-production ratio was 
negative and significant. The outcome of this reflected the position of U.A.E.: it 
demanded a higher production quota, despite its low population and lesser 
income needs. The market-sharing hypothesis was accepted for U.A.E. Iran's 
model showed that the exchange rate coefficient was significant and positive. This 
might reflect its need for hard currencies. The reserves-to-production ratio was 
significant and negative. This might have--resulted from the war, which limited its 
production capacity. But the coefficient sign of the price was consistent with the 
general behavior of Iran as a price-pusher. Iraq's coefficient of other OPEC 
countries' production was positive and significant, whereas the price coefficient 
was negative and not significant. The ratio of reserves to production was 
significant and negative. The coefficient of CAB was expected to be negative, but 
was positive and significant. The market-sharing hypothesis was accepted. 
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Qatar's and Algeria's models showed that the other OPEC countries' production 
coefficients were positive and significant, while the coefficients for price were 
negative and insignificant. The reserves-to-production ratio was negative and 
insignificant for both. This seemed to fit the constant market-sharing hypothesis. 
The results of the cartel models were compared with those of Griffin's 
(1985) cartel models (Table XII). The other OPEC countries' production 
coefficients (QOO) were very consistent with Griffin's estimates. The price 
coefficients of Kuwait, Ubya, and U.A.E. were consistent with his estimates, while 
the other countries' price coefficients were not significant but were close in their 
magnitude to Griffin's (1985) estimates. However, the insignificance of these 
countries' price coefficients could be attributed to the large number of variables 
used in the cartel model, a few observations, and the change in oil production and 
prices after 1983, which Griffin's study did not cover. 
The OPEC countries were grouped according to core, price-pusher, and 
expansionist groups (Eckbo, 1979). First, it was useful to test OPEC's production 
behavior for each group to identify common behavior after including the non-
economic factors. Second, in a statistical sense, it was meaningful to compare 
each individual country's regression coefficients with the LSDV coefficients of the 
different hypotheses (H1• H2• and H3) as another alternative to check for efficiency 
and consistency. It was expected that LSDV for each group would be more 
efficient than the estimate of each individual's regression, because LSDV had a 
higher degree of freedom. 
88 
TABLE X~~ 
COMPARISON OF THIS STUDY'S CARTEL RESULTS AND GRIFFIN'S (1985) 
CARTEL RESULTS 
FAHED(1990) GRIFFIN (1985) 
CARTEL RESULTS 
-2 CARTEL RESULTS ~ LOGRP LOGQOO R IDGP LOGQOO 
SAUDI .16 1.06* .90 .29 .74 .49 
( .20) (.30) ( .04) ( .13) 
~RAH -.16 .60 .93 .05 .88 .69 
(.17) ( .31) (.02) (.15) 
IRAQ -.17 1.01* .94 .29 -.06 .49 
(.08) (.12) ( .05) ( .48) 
KUWAIT -.40* .78* .96 -.39 1.41 .90 
(.14) (.23) ( .03) ( .12) 
VENEZUELA -.10* -.02 .9B -.25 .17 .75 
(.03) (.06) ( .02) ( .OB) 
QATAR -.08 .70* .86 -.03 .88 .73 
(.07) (.13) (.02) ( .08) 
~BYA -.24* .79* .94 -.27 .72 .59 
(.07) (.06) ( .05) ( .18) 
~NDOHESIA .05 .78* .95 .26 .56 .83 
(.07) ( .12) (.02) (.06) 
U.A.E. .16* 1.04* .91 .20 1.00 .80 
(.05) ( .11) ( .02) ( .08) 
AIGERIA -.08 .74* .96 .005 .74 .69 
(.09) ( .05) (.02) (.07) 
N~GERIA .14* .51* .97 .10 1.13 .68 
( .06) ( .08) (.03) ( .11) 
'* SIGNIFICANT AT 5% LEVEL. 
A) STANDARD ERRORS ARE IN PARENTHESES. 
89 
The hypotheses of overall homogeneity (H1) and partial homogeneity of 
the slope's coefficients (~) were rejected for the core group; these countries did 
not behave the same way, and this difference contradicted the general view of this 
group's behavior. This group was pooled according to the partial homogeneity 
of a common intercept and different slopes (H3). Table XIII shows the LSDV 
results for this group. The LSDV results were compared with those for each 
individual member of this group. The overall results were consistent with the 
individual member's results, but the individual member's results were more efficient 
than these for LSDV. 
The price-pusher group was pooled according to the hypotheses of 
common slope and different intercepts (H2) and common intercept and different 
slopes (H3) as shown in Tables XIV and XV. LSDV (H2) indicated that the price 
coefficient was negative and significant, whereas the other OPEC production 
coefficient was positive and significant. Also, the exchange rate and CAB 
coefficients were significant and positive. The coefficient for the population growth 
rate was negative and significant. This was the only group for which the coefficient 
of armed attacks was significant and negative as expected. The reserves-to-
production ratio was negative and significant. Thus, the partial market-sharing 
hypothesis was accepted. The behavior of this group was consistent with the 
price pushers' behavior, because this group was willing to sacrifice some of its 
market share for higher oil prices. 
TABLE XIII 
CORE COUNTRIES (LSOV, H3) RESULTS FOR 1971-1987A 
LOGRP LOGQOO LOGEX LOGCAB LOGPOP LOGATT LOGR/QO 
SAUDI .17 1.09* .59 -.09 -.23 .005 -.50* 
(.14)8 (.15) (.55) ( .10) (.77) (.01) (.14 ) 
QATAR -.05 .67* .41 ' .09 .07 -.02 -.43* 
( .11) ( .17) ( .48) ( .15) (.50) (.03 ) ( .16) 
LIBYA -.25* .55* .99* .21 .08 -.01 -.001 
(.08) ( .12) ( .44) (.13 ) (.85) (.02) (.04 ) 
U.A.E. .07 .67* -.07 -.09 .23 -.006 -.37* 
(.08 ) ( .1'6) (.08 ) (.13 ) (.88 ) (.01) (.17 ) 
KUWAIT -.16 .68* .60 .24 .82 .01 -.31 
(.14 ) (.21) ( .41) ( .18) (1.6) (.0,1) ( .18) 
*' SIGNIFICANT AT 5% LEVEL. 
A) LSDV IS THE LEAST SQUARES WITH DUMMY VARIABLES. H3 IS THE 
HYPOTHESIS OF COMMON INTERCEPT AND DIFFERENT SLOPES. 
B) STANDARD ERRORS ARE IN PARENTHESES. 
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TABLE XIV 
PRICE-PUSHER CUNTRIES (LSDY, H2) RESULTS FOR 1971-1987A 
LOGRP LOGQOO LOGEX LOGCAB LOGPOP LOGATT LOGR/QO 
-.12* .35* .11* .36* 
(.02)8 (.10) (.02) (.12) 
-3.76* -.003* -.29* 
(1.45) (.001) (.05) 
TABLE x:v 
PRICE-PUSHER COUNTRIES (LSDY, H3) RESULTS FOR 1971-1987C 
LOGRP LOGQOO LOGEX LOGCAB LOGPOP LOGATT LOGR/QO 
-.07 .80* 1.39* .1* 1.69* -.00* -.77* 
( .11) ( .20) (.29) ( .25) (2.86) ( .001) ( .15) 
VENEZUELA -.08 .01 -.004* .05* 156.38* -.004 -.56 
(.10) (.34) ( .27) ( .19) (68.29) (.009) (.29) 
ALGERIA -.12 .55* .12 -.22 -.62 .01 -.11 
( .10) ( .10) (.11) ( .28) (1.5) ( .01) (.06) 
* SIGNIFICANT AT 5% LEVEL. 
A) LSDV IS THE LEAST SQUARES WITH DUMMY VARIABLES. H2 IS THE 
HYPOTHESIS OF COMMON SLOPE AND DIFFERENT INTERCEPTS. 
B) STANDARD ERRORS ARE IN PARENTHESES. 
C) H3 IS THE HYPOTHESIS OF COMMON INTERCEPT AND DIFFERENT SLOPES. 
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For the expansionist group, the hypotheses of overall homogeneity (H,) 
and partial homogeneity of the slope's coefficients (H2) were rejected. These 
countries' production behavior was not consistent with the common view of 
expansionist behavior. The hypothesis of common intercept and different slopes 
(H3) was accepted for this group. The data were pooled according to this 
hypothesis, and the results are shown in Table XVI. These results did not 
contradict the model results for the individual members of this group. However, 
each individual country's model results were more efficient than the LSDV results. 
COMPETITIVE MODEL 
As could be seen from the outcome of this project. the cartel model did 
indeed explain OPEC's behavior; thus, the test of the competitive model was 
primarily to further clarify OPEC's behavior. The estimate of the competitive model 
for the 11 OPEC countries for the 1971-1987 period (excluding Ecuador and 
Gabon) is as follows, with standard errors in parentheses: 
Log Ojt = 1.91 - .05 Log RPjt + .18 Log Rjt - .06 Log RPit•1 
(.22) (.01) (.03) (.01) 
+.14 Log R it•1 
(.03) 
Buse R2 = .40 N = 187 
The coefficient of the price was negative and significant. This finding 
contradicted the premise of the competitive model. OPEC did not respond to the 
change in oil price and vary its production as it should have done in a competitive 
1] 
TABLE XVI 
EXPANSIONIST COUNTRIES (LSDV, H3) RESULTS FOR 1971-1987h 
LOGRP LOGQOO LOGEX LOGCAB LOGPOP LOGA'l'T LOGR/QO 
IRAQ -.13 .98'" .23 .. 45'" -3.06 -.00 -.29* (.10)8 (.09) (.49) ( .10) (2.15) (.002) ( .10) 
INDONESIA .02 .70'" -.13 -.07 .12 .01 -.15 
(.07) (.14 ) (.24) ( .40) (.67) ( .02) (.14) 
NIGERIA .14 .54 .... .01 .07 72.70 .01 -.67* (.08) (.25) (.10), ( .20) (47.93) (.01) ( .17) 
* SIGNIFICANT AT 5% LEVEL. 
A) LSDV IS THE LEAST SQUARES WITH DUMMY VARIABLES. H3 IS THE 
HYPOTHESIS OF COMMON INTERCEPT AND DIFFERENT SLOPES. 
B) STANDARD ERRORS ARE IN PARENTHESES. 
~ 
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market. The competitive model did not offer any further explanation of OPEC's 
behavior. 
TARGET REVENUE MODEL 
The target revenue model was utilized for 6 of OPEC's 13 members. The 
countries were Saudi Arabia, Venezuela, Kuwait, Indonesia, Algeria, and Nigeria, 
for which data were available on the four independent variables. The target 
revenue model for the 1971-1987 period with standard errors in parenthesis is as 
follows. The strict version of the target revenue theory (B2 = 1, 81 = 1) states that 
investment needs have an impact on OPEC's production decisions and that OPEC 
varies its production according to investment needs, measured by the gross fixed 
capital formulation, the CAB, and foreign reserves as follows, with standard errors 
in parentheses: 
Log 0it = 2.86 - .11 Log RP it + .13 Log GFCit.1 + .13 Log FRit.1 
(.10) (.05) (.06) (.03) 
+ .0001 Log CABit.1 
(.005) 
Buse R2 = .33 N = 102 
The real oil price coefficient was negative and insignificant, whereas the 
GFC coefficient was positive and significant. The pooied model and the regression 
of individual countries rejected the strict version of the target revenue model. 
However, the investment needs could have had some influence on OPEC's 
production (82 > 0, 81 < 0); the pooled model rejected this version too. The 
regression models for Kuwait and Algeria showed that the investment and price 
95 
coefficients were significant. Thus, the partial version of the target revenue theory 
could not be rejected for these two countries. This outcome did not mean that the 
investment needs did not influence OPEC's production, since the investment 
coefficients for five of the six countries were positive and significant. In addition 
to investment needs, there were other needs that each individual country might 
have wanted to satisfy, such as reducing the CAB deficit or building more foreign 
reserves for long-term needs. This model accounted for these variables. The 
pooled model showed that the CAB coefficient was negative and insignificant. 
Only the Algerian regression model produced a CAB coefficient that was negative 
and significant. 
Foreign reserves were included in the target revenue model, in order to 
control OPEC's borrowing from its own foreign reserves. The foreign reserve 
coefficient was positive and significant for the pooled model. The individual 
coefficients were positive and significant for only two countries: Kuwait and 
Algeria. The foreign reserve data did not show a rapid decline in foreign reserves 
for each individual country; thus, there was probably no need for an increase in 
the output, which might have affected OPEC's stability. 
PROPERTY RIGHTS MODEL 
The property rights model was performed for eight OPEC members (Saudi 
Arabia, Iran, Libya, Indonesia, U.A.E., Algeria, Nigeria, and Kuwait) for the 1971-
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1982 period for which the data were available, with standard errors in parentheses: 
0it = 3.21 + .09 GCP it 
(.01) (.01) Buse R2 = .28 N = 88 
The pooled model showed that the coefficient of government production 
control (GCP) was positive and significant. The property rights model was 
consequently rejected for OPEC. However. the individual regressions showed 
negative and significant signs for Libya and Kuwait only. The prediction of the 
property rights model was very weak; this weakness could be attributed to 
misspecification or to the deficiency of the theory itself. It is important to note that 
there has been a strong disagreement about the effect of the property rights 
model. Recently, Adelman (1989) has argued that the nationalization of the oil 
companies by the host countries did not lead to lower discounts, but instead to 
higher discounts. The property rights model clearly supported Adelman's 
argument. 
CHAPTER VI 
IMPLICATIONS 
OPEC MARKET SHARE STABILITY 
Short-Term 
It was evident in this study that a partial market-sharing cartel model best 
explained OPEC's production behavior. This short-term analysis indicated that the 
internal cartel market share stability depended on the oil price elasticity of supply. 
OPEC's oil production, the ratio of reserves to production, the dollar value in 
relation to foreign currencies, and the CAB. Also, the results showed that OPEC's 
production was influenced by the political instability of some OPEC members. The 
price elasticity of supply of -.06 indicated that OPEC's production was not sensitive 
to an increase in the real oil price. But each OPEC member's individual 
production depended on other OPEC production, which has a moderate elasticity 
of .41. This meant each OPEC member's production is sensitive to other OPEC 
production and there is potential for quota violation. But if OPEC members 
cooperate with each other and keep their production up to their agreeable 
production quotas, the problem could be avoided. Historically. OPEC's quota 
violations came most often from Kuwait and U.AE. At the end of 1989. U.A.E.'s 
over-production was creating serious problems to the cartel in keeping the oil price 
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at approximately $18 per barrel (Sullivan and Tanner, 1990). The ratio of reserves 
to production (as a measure of potential production) has an elasticity of -.16. In 
this situation, OPEC can increase its production with less of an effect on its excess 
capacity, so that there is no threat to the cartel's market share stability. Therefore. 
the market share of OPEC has to increase while its reserves-to-production ratio 
must decline, to maintain the organization's market share stability, because a 
surplus in the excess capacity and a decreased market share rate would lead to 
instability of the cartel. 
The exchange rate and CAB elasticities were .04 and .16, respectively. 
Despite the low elasticity of these two factors, OPEC should take them into 
account in its production decisions in order to maximize its revenues. The 
potential for political instability has an impact on OPEC's production decisions. so 
OPEC should not overlook this matter and should allow some flexibility in its 
assigned quotas to overcome this problem. Also, previous studies showed that 
the short-term price elasticities of supply and demand ranged from -.04 to .21, and 
from -.05 to .31, respectively (Table XVII); these findings were consistent with the 
outcomes of this study. Also, this study indicated that Saudi Arabia acted as a 
dominant producer in the world oil market in order to stabilize world oil production 
and prices during the 1981-1987 period. Because Saudi Arabia was trying to 
stabilize the world oil market and gain non-OPEC cooperation to ease the pressure 
on its shrinking market share, the world oil market could not be stabilized without 
the agreement between non-OPEC countries and OPEC countries onthe oil prices 
and production for an agreeable market share distribution. 
TABLE XVII 
PRICE ELASTICITIES OF OIL DEMAND AND SUPPLY 
MacAvoy(1982)m 
Griffin(1979)m 
Marquez(1984)m 
WOKS-
MORRISON-
EMF-
Short run 
.31 
-.05 
-.04 
-.065 
-.09 
Demand 
Lonq run 2 o YEARS 
-.29 
-.71 
-.25 
-.335 -.558 
-.35 -.60 
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25YEARS 
-.64 
-.60 
-.60 
***************************************************************** 
E.I.E. C 
GATELY,KYLE,FISCHERC• 
KENNEDYc 
Supply 
Short run Lonq run 
.04 .8 
.01 .22 
.33 
Source: m) Marquez, 1984; w) Baldwin and Prosser, 1988; 
c) MacAvoy, 1982. 
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Long-Term 
The internal and external OPEC market share stability depends not only 
on the short-term factors discussed above, but also on the long-term factors. 
Forecasting the OPEC oil supply for five or ten years into the future is a complex 
process, as uncertainty will always exist. In the long run, all factors that are 
constant in the short term will change, and what is inelastic can become less 
inelastic or elastic. Economic, social, and political stabilities can change suddenly 
in the long term. All this can lead to a supply disruption like the ones that 
occurred in 1973 and 1979. 
OPEC's long-term market share stability will depend on the price elasticity 
of the crude oil supply, the world demand, non-OPEC production, and the excess 
capacity of OPEC's production. The higher price elasticity of the worl~ oil demand 
(-.73) will lead to lower oil production by the cartel and may increase the real oil 
price to $32 per barrel by the year 2000, whereas a lower elasticity (-.365) will lead 
to instability in the core countries' production, which may reduce the real oil price 
to $15 per barrel. Other studies, such as Energy Modeling Forum's, had a lower 
estimated elasticity range of -.375 to -.6 by the year 2000 (Daly, Griffin, and Steele, 
1982). Previous literature estimated the long-term elasticity of the oil demand and 
supply as indicated above. 
According to the International Energy Outlook (1989), world oil prices are 
expected to increase from $18 a barrel in 1990 to about $35 a barrel in 2000, 
assuming the trend of high world oil prices continues (Figure 12). The oil 
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demand in the market economies will grow slowly for the next five years, as a 
result of lower world oil prices and economic growth in importing countries. The 
oil demand will increase from about 48 MBD in 1987 to about 52 MBD by 1993. 
But the oil demand will increase slightly after 1993, and it will be relatively stable 
from then until the year 2000, as shown in Figure 13. The oil consumption is 
predicted to grow in the range of 1 to 2.4 percent in the developing countries, 
especially the OPEC countries, throughout the 1990s; and the growth of oil 
consumption for OECD will range from 0 to 1.2 percent through the same period. 
Excess production capacity will disappear by the year 2000, because of the 
increase in world oil consumption. In turn, oil prices will rise, and this increase will 
enable OPEC members to gain power again in the world oil market. OPEC must 
maintain its quotas through the 1990s to gain more of the market share and higher 
prices by 2000. A slow world oil demand will not increase the price of oil without 
reducing the over-production problem. Excess production capacity was evident 
in 1985, and it will likely continue until 1994. This excess resulted from non-OPEC 
production, Iraq's production after the cease-fire, and the violation of quotas by 
some OPEC members. OPEC's demand will be strong by 1995. because non-
OPEC production capacity will start to decline and the world demand will increase 
as a result of low oil prices in the early 1990s. OPEC's production capacity will 
continue to rise through the 1990s from 28.2 MBD in 1988 to 36 MBD, while non-
OPEC production capacity will decline from 27.5 MBD to 24.3 MBD (Table XVIII). 
Figure 14 contrasts world oil production capacity, consumption, and 
excess production capacity; this comparison shows that excess production 
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TASt.E XVIII 
on. PROOUCTION CAPACfr'(. ,9aa-2OQO 
(MIUJON BARAa.S PER OA..., 
ESTIMATED 
1988 PROJECTlON RANGES 
1990 1995 2000 
UNJ1'ED STATES 10.6 !U·10.2 8.4-1.4 7.8-9.1 
CANADA ~O 1~1 1~1.8 1.4-1.5 
MEXICO ~9 2.9-3.1 3.1-3.4 3.1-3.5 
NOR'I'HSEA 3.94.0 4.0-4.3 304-3.9 2.9-3.4 
OlliER NON'()PEC 8.1 8.4-9.2 7.4-8.5 6.C).7..2 
TOTAl NON'()PEC 27.5 27.2·28.8 24.3-25.8 21.6-24.3 
AlGERIA 1..2 0.9-1.1 0.9-1.1 0.7-0.9 
ECUADOR 0.3 0.243 0.2-0.3 0..2-0.3 
GABON 0..2 0.2-0..3 0..2-0.3 0.1-0..2 
INDONES(A 1.5 1.4.1.5 1..2·1.4 1.c)'1..2 
IRAN 3.0 3.0-4.0 3.5-4.5 3.3-4.5 
IRAQ 2.7 3.5-4.5 4.0.5.0 4.5-5.5 
KlJNNr 2.S 2.8-3.0 3.0-3.5 3.0-3.8 
UBYA 1.8 1.5-1.7 1.3-1.7 U·1.7 
NJG~ 1.7 1.5-1.7 1.2·1.G 1.1-1.5 
QATM 0.8 0.54.5 0.4-0.8 0.3-0.5 
SAUDI 11.5 8.C).9.5 9-0-10.5. SI.5-U.o 
UAE. 2.0 2.GU 2.2-2.8 2.5-3.0 
VENEZUElA ~4 2.42.1 ~ 2.$.3.0 
TOTAl OPEC 28..2 ~ 30.5-35.0 31.3-36.0 
NET CPE EXPORt'S ~4 2.2-2.7 1.4-2.4 1.0-2.0 
TOTAlIMRKET ECONOMIES 58.1 sa&62.7 SI :1-62.7 55.4-«11 
SOURCe: Inlernalional Energy OutIoolr,. Ene.;, Information Administration, 1989 • 
•... ~---.-~-.. ----------
I: 
figure 13. Oil consumption in the market economies for 1970-2000. 
Source: International Ener9Y Outlook, Ener9Y Information 
Administration, 1989. 
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capacity will decline by 1995, when the world's consumption will increase. This will 
lead to an increase in OPEC's market share. It is expected that OPEC's market 
share will increase from 42 percent in 1989 to 53 percent in 2000. Non-OPEC 
production will continue to increase until 1994, when it will start to decline. Non-
OPEC countries will not be able to increase oil discovery rates or reserves, 
because of low world oil prices. Production capacity and market share are 
influenced by the price of crude oil and the sum of available resources. High oil 
prices will increase non-OPEC production and the discovery rate, which will 
increase OPEC's production. The OPEC countries' excess capacity means a 
lower market share and higher oil prices, as in the late 1970s and the beginning 
of the 1980s. OPEC's internal market share can be stabilized if its share in the 
world oil market increases and its reserves-to-production ratio decreases. 
Unfortunately, this kind of stabilization did not occur in the late 1970s and the 
1980s (Figure 15). The internal and external OPEC market share stability in the 
future will also be related to non-OPEC production and world energy consumption. 
Non-OPEC production capacity will decline after 1995, while the world energy 
demand will be increasing but at a slower rate. Conversely, OPEC will increase 
its production capacity through the 1990s, if there is no disruption in its production 
(International Energy Outlook, 1989). 
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Figure 15. OPEC reserves to production ratio (R/Q) and OPEC's 
market share (OPMK) of the free world production for 1971-1987. 
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CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSIONS 
The conclusions of this study were that the Chow-test indicated no 
structural shift in OPEC's overall production behavior between the 1971-1982 and 
1983-1987 periods. The CCTA cartel model showed a very significant result, and 
there was a clear distinction between its result and those of other OPEC models. 
Therefore, the partial market-sharing hypothesis was confirmed to be significant 
for all OPEC members included in this study. Furthermore, internal political 
stability was significant at 10 percent. It was also significant at 5 percent for the 
price-pusher group (Iran, Venezuela, and Algeria). This was the only group 
pooled, due to common slope and different intercepts, using LSDV. The price-
pusher group's production behavior was consistent with the common view and 
these countries' behavior; they were accepting lower market shares for higher oil 
prices. Also, this study found that Saudi Arabia did not act as a dominant 
producer within OPEC but it did act as a dominant producer in the world oil 
market through the 1981-1987 period. In general, the CCTA model's results 
indicate that OPEC's production strategies are irrational, based only on economic 
factors, without accounting for non-economic factors. Political instability in any 
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OPEC country can lead to a crisis situation, which will disrupt its oil supply and 
jeopardize its economic interests. 
LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
This study was limited by the available data. The OPEC data were 
deficient, and sometimes the researcher had to use two sources of data and then 
to check the consistency among these sources. The potential for deficiency can 
be seen in energy data that has to be revised almost every year. 
It was expected that political instability would have a stronger impact on 
oil production in some OPEC countries. such as Iraq and Nigeria, especially during 
the 1980s. Historical data on these two countries showed that political instability 
persisted. This instability might not be captured by the use of annual political data. 
but it would be captured by the use of monthly or quarterly data. This meant that 
the effects of political events were stronger in the very short term than in the long 
term. The unavailability of political information that is updated on a monthly or 
quarterly basis restricted the use of these data. But annual political data were 
available for the period from 1971 to 1982, and they had to be coded up to 1987. 
Furthermore. the researcher has to wrestle with the question of whether 
the data on OPEC's decisions about the production and prices really reflected 
what occurred in every OPEC meeting. Nevertheless, these data are the best 
available statistical energy data and they have been used by well recognized 
--~-----
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energy economists. However, it was the responsibility of the researcher to make 
the best of the available energy information. 
SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
This study was concerned with OPEC's production behavior and its 
implications in the short and long terms. The political variables were used here to 
measure the internal political instability of each OPEC country only. The results of 
this study revealed that pOlitical instability certainly did have an impact on OPEC's 
oil production. Even though this study did find a simple direct relationship 
between the political instability in OPEC countries and their oil production 
decisions, more complex relationships should be developed. This study should 
be expanded to cover more political dimensions. 
Further research should be extended to cover the political events that 
occur among OPEC countries (inter-OPEC countries). Also, the research should 
not only focus on the negative effects of political instability (conflictive events), but 
it should examine the positive aspects of political stability (cooperative events). 
Furthermore, future research should investigate the political events that 
occur between OPEC nations and non-OPEC nations. Inclusion of all three 
aspects of the political environment --intra-country , inter-OPEC nations, and external 
OPEC political stability--will lead to a comprehensive study of OPEC countries' 
political instability, which will increase understanding of the relationship between 
the pOlitical instability in OPEC countries and OPEC's production behavior. 
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Overall, potential research should examine the absolute magnitude of each OPEC 
member in response to the intensity of political events, in terms of the increase or 
decrease in these political events and the implication of each country's magnitude 
for future OPEC production. 
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APPENDIX A 
POLITICAL VARIABLES DEFINITIONS 
An armed attack (705) is an act of violent political conflict carried out by (or 
on behalf of) an organized group with the object of weakening or destroying the 
power exercised by another organized group. It is characterized by bloodshed, 
physical struggle, and the destruction of property. A wide variety of weapons may 
be used, including guns, explosives (conventional bombs, hand grenades, letter 
bombs), chemicals, bricks and other primitive hand weapons such as spears, 
knives or clubs. This category is intended to encompass all organized political 
violence, although assassinations are coded separately. It excludes all 
spontaneous violence. Also excluded are activities of organized crime which are 
not observed to be directly relevant to political cleavages and issues. The target 
of an armed attack is typically a regime, a government, or a political leader, but it 
may also be a religious, ethnic, racial, linguistic, or special interest minority. When 
a government is unable or unwilling to control an insurgency situation by normal 
sanctions . . . it may also resort to armed attacks. For the 1968-1982 period, 
whenever possible, armed attacks by governmental and military forces (707) were 
coded separately from those undertaken by insurgents (706). When it was 
impossible to determine which side initiated the event, or when a battle or clash 
was reported, the generiC armed attack code (705) was used. All three types were 
aggregated together in the annual and quarterly series. 
Protest demonstration (type: 700) is a non-violent gathering of people 
organized for the announced purpose of protesting a regime, a government, or 
one of its leaders; its ideology, policy, or intended policy, or its previous action or 
intended action. The issues of protest involved are perceived as significant at the 
national level, but within that framework demonstrations directed at all levels and 
branches of government are included. This category of events includes 
demonstrations for or against a foreign government, its leaders, or its visiting 
representatives when such demonstrations are reported to indicate opposition to 
the demonstrator's own government. Not included are election meetings and 
rallies, political parades, and normal holiday celebrations. A residual category of 
other protests (712) was coded separately for the 1968-1982 period, but was 
aggregated with demonstrations in the annual and quarterly series. 
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Political strike is a work stoppage by a body of industrial or service workers 
or a stoppage of normal academic life by students to protest a regime or its 
leaders' policies or actions. Strikes which were primarily directed at economic 
goals (higher wages, better working conditions, shorter hours) were not coded, 
even if the employer was a public enterprise. If there were a greater pOlitical 
significance to the strike, we coded it. An indicator of such significance would be 
a political party's or movement's embracing of these economic demands, and 
supporting and disseminating them with the objective of embarrassing the 
government, eroding its base of support and even precipitating its fall. For the 
1968-82 period[,] we distinguished political strikes involving workers (710) from 
those involving only students (711). The two were added together in the annual 
and quarterly series. A political strike may last for many days or weeks, but it was 
counted as a single event, unless its essential nature changed. For example, a 
new category of strikers might join in or a new set of goals might be announced. 
In cases of this sort, a new event was coded. 
The imposition of censorship (726) includes actions by the government to 
limit, to curb, or to intimidate the mass media, including newspapers, magazines, 
books, radio, and television. Typical examples of such action are the clOSing of 
newspapers or journals, the censoring of articles in the domestic press, and the 
controlling of dispatches sent cut of the country. The relaxation of censorship 
(729) involves the modification or elimination of controls on the mass media. 
These event types are reported in the daily events file, but they are combined with 
reports of the imposition and relaxation of other restrictions in the annual and 
quarterly events file. 
The imposition of other political restrictions (727) includes actions taken by 
the government to neutralize, to suppress, or to eliminate a perceived threat to the 
security of the government, the regime, or the state itself. Although this category 
encompasses a diversity of governmental activities, all of them share the 
characteristic of constituting specific responses to a perceived security problem 
at the national level even though sanctions are sometimes carried out by 
subnational governmental units. An attempt has been made to exclude sanctions 
against criminal behavior that has no political relevance. This does not mean that 
organized crime or crime in the streets are unimportant or that they do not indicate 
a degree of social dissatisfaction. Rather, we have tried to maintain a focus on 
behavior that is directly political, Le., behavior concerned with the distribution and 
use of political power in the pOlity. The relaxation of political re~1rictions (730) 
involves the modification or elimination of these restrictions. 
A riot (704) is a violent demonstration or disturbance involving a large 
number of people. Riots are distinguished from protest demonstrations by the 
presence of violence. Violence implies the use of physical force and is usually 
evidenced by the destruction of property, the wounding or killing of people, the 
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use of riot control equipment such as clubs, guns, gas, and water cannons, and 
by the rioters' use of various weapons. If destruction of property (e.g., the burning 
of automobiles, the smashing of storefronts, and the throwing of molotov cocktails) 
iot> "' ... "".,..,."" ... +i",1 ,.." ......... " ... "" ... + ... f +10 .. "" "h.,."" ... ,,,,,,.a h""h",,,i"r tho o\lont i~ ennod as a r",ot I";' QII ~1iOiII~vIILIQI ~'-'III"'Ullwll" VI LII'Wi U"'~wl y""' .... """'I'~"I'-'I, ". ,.., ..,. ... "'......... __ _ 
rather than as a demonstration" Demonstrations that changed nature within the 
course of a single day were coded for the 1968-1982 period separately. Peaceful 
demonstrations that were met by police violence (702) and demonstrations that 
turned into riots of their own accord (703) were coded as single events each and 
were aggregated in the annual and quarterly series with riots to form a series 
comparable with the riots series of the first 20 years. Frequently, demonstrations 
turning violent were the result of two or more rival groups clashing when their 
demonstrations ran afoul of each other. In these instances, the participation of a 
multiplicity of groups was noted among the attributes, but only one event was 
coded. 
Riots are distinguished from armed attacks by the degree of spontaneity. 
Riots may sometimes be planned, but the riot organizers constitute a small, often 
invisible, portion of the rioters. Events were classified as riots of it appeared from 
the report that most of those involved were violently agitated in their behavior, that 
they formed an excited or confused mob or crowd, that they were engaged in 
unpredictable acts of disorder, and that the objects of their violence would not 
seem to be closely related to the objects of their political discontent in the analysis 
of a dispassionate observer (World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators, 
1985). 
Buse R2 can be interpreted in the same way as R2 with ordinary least 
squares. The only difference is that Buse R2 cannot be used to test for the 
significance of the regression (Buse. 1973). 
APPENDIX B 
BASIC TIME SERIES CRUDE OIL DATA 
~-~---~-----------~ 
124 
APPENDIX B 
Definitions of Variables 
QS = Saudi Arabia's oil production in million barrels per day. 
QIRAN = Iran's oil production in million barrels per day. 
QIRAQ = Iraq's oil production in million barrels per day. 
QV = Venezuela's oil production in million barrels per day. 
OL = Libya's oil production in million barrels per day. 
QQ = Qatar's oil production in million barrels per day. 
QUAE = United Arab Emirates' oil production in million barrels per day. 
QALG = Algeria's oil production in million barrels per day. 
OIND = Indonesia's oil production in million barrels per day. 
ONIC = Nigeria's oil production in million barrels per day. 
OK = Kuwait's oil production in million barrels per day. 
PRIC = OPEC's nominal oil price. 
RESS = OPEC's crude oil reserves annually as of January 1st in 
billions of barrels. 
EX = Exchange rate in U.S. dollars. 
CABB = Current account balance in billion U.S. dollars. 
GNB82 
- The 1982 U.S. GPO deflator rate. 
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GDPB 
-
Gross domestic product in billion dollars. 
POP = Population growth rate. 
TQoO 
= OPEC's oil production in million barrels per day. 
QOo 
= Other OPEC production. excluding individual production. in 
million barrelS per day. 
PRTS = Annual number of protests in Saudi Arabia. 
PRTIR :; A __ ~ __ I .... I.....,...~.a .. I""\f nrntoQ:tc in Ir~n 1"'\1 IlIUCli I lUI I IU-WI VII'"'I ""' .. ..,-." .. "" ... II _ ••• 
PRTIQ = Annual number of protests in Iraq. 
PRTV = Annual number of protests in Venezuela. 
PRTQ = Annual number of protests in Qatar. 
PRTL = Annual number of protests in Libya. 
PRTIN = Annual number of protests in Indonesia. 
PRTUAE = Annual number of protests in United Arab Emirates. 
PRTAL = Annual number of protests in Algeria. 
PRTN = Annual number of protests in Nigeria. 
PRTK = Annual number of protests in Kuwait. 
riot = Annual number of riots. 
att = Annual number of protests. 
str = Annual number of strikes. 
gs = Annual number of government sanctions. 
FR = Foreign reserves minus gold in billion dollars. 
*AII variables are for annual time periods. 
gfcm 
GCP = 
gcp% = 
RIO = 
TCAS = 
T'NS = 
OPMK = 
NON-OP = 
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Fixed domestic capital in billion dollars. 
Parent company's estimated gross share of crude oil 
production in million barrels per day. 
GCT divided by individual oil production. 
The ratio of reserves to production. 
The total of OPEC's CUiiant account balance in billion dol!ars. 
Non-communist oil consumption in million barrels per day. 
Percentage of OPEC's market share of non-communist world 
oil production. 
Non-OPEC oil production, excluding communist countries, in 
million barrels per day. 
------ ----
127 
Data for Cartel Model and Competitive Models 
YEAR ••• QS PRIC RES8 EX CAB8 
1.971.00 4.77 1.75 141.35 4.49 0.97 
1972.00 6.02 1.90 157.47 4.14 2.09 
2973.00 7.60 2.10 146.00 3.71 2.52 
1974.00 8.48 9.60 140.75 3.55 23.03 
1975.00 7.08 10.46 173.15 3.52 14.39 
1976.00 8.58 11.51 151.80 3.53 14.36 
1977.00 9.20 12.09 154.55 3.53 11.99 
1978.00 8.76 12.70 153.10 3.40 -2.21 
1979.00 9.53 13.34 168.94 3.36 11.17 
2980.00 9.90 26.00 166.48 3.33 41.40 
3.981.00 9.81 32.00 168.03 3.38 41.13 
1982.00 6.49 34.00 167.85 3.43 7.58 
1983.00 5.06 34.00 165.32 '3.45 -17.14 
1984.00 4.65 29.00 168.85 3.52 -18.40 
1985.00 3.47 29.00 171.71 3.62 -12.93 
1986.00 .5.10 28.00 171.49 3.70 -11.90 
1987.00 4.26 17.52 169.18 3.75 -9.57 
GNP82 GOP8 pop TQOO (200 
0.44 -5.11 0.02 25.09 20.32 
0.47 6.82 0.02 26.71 20.69 
0.50 10.94 O.O~ 30.99 23.39 
0.54 27.98 O.~2 30.75 22.27 
0.59 39.69 0.05 27.20 20.13 
0.63 46.61 0.05 30.56 21.98 
0.67 58.17 0.05 31.42 22.22 
0.72 65.82 0.05 30.37 21.61 
0.79 73.91 0.05 30.91 21.38 
0.86 115.97 0.05 26.94 17.04 
0.94 153.91 0.04 22.68 12.87 
1.00 153.06 0.04 18.89 12.41 
1.04 120.19 0.04 17.54 12.48 
1.08 105.57 0.04 17.44 12.79 
1.11 90.23 0.04 16.12 12.65 
1.14 75.25 0.04 18.54 13.44 
1.18 71.41 0.12 17.76 13.50 
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yearS OIRAN PRIC RESB EX CABB 
1971 4.55 1.75 70.00 75.75 -0.12 
1972 5.02 1.91 55.50 75.75 -0.39 
1973 5.86 2.11 65.00 68.88 0.15 
1974 6.02 10.63 60.00 67.63 12.27 
1975 5.35 10.67 66.00 67.64 4.71 
1976 5.92 11.62 64.50 70.22 7.66 
1977 5.70 12.81 63.00 70.62 2.82 
1978 5.21 12.81 62.00 70.48 0.10 
1979 3.17 13.45 59.00 70.48 11.97 
1980 1~66 30.00 58.00 70.62 -2.44 
1981 1.38 37.00 57.50 78.33 -3.45 
1982 2.28 34.20 57.00 83.60 5.73 
1983 2.49 31.20 55.31 86.36 0.36 
1984 2.19 28.00 51.00 90.03 -0.41 
1985 2.26 28.00 48.50 91.05 2.47 
1986 1.93 28.05 47.88 78.76 -1.27 
1987 2.45 17.50 48.80 71.46 -0.51 
GNP82 GDPB pop TQOO QO 
0.44 12.79 0.03 25.09 20.32 
0.47 15.95 0.03 26.71 20.69 
0.50 25.61 0.03 30.99 23.39 
0.54 45.69 0.03 30.75 22.27 
0.59 51.92 0.03 27.20 20.13 
0.63 66.89 0.03 30.56 21.98 
0.67 84.22 0.03 31.42 22.22 
0.?2 78.46 0.04 30.37 21.61 
0.79 89.89 0.03 30.91 21.38 
0.86 98.08 0.05 26.94 17.04 
0.94 106.26 0.04 22.68 12.87 
1.00 128.66 0.04 18.89 12.41 
1.04 156.00 0.04 17.54 12.48 
1.08 163.31 0.04 17.44 12.79 
1.11 164.65 0.04 16.12 12.65 
1.14 165.06 0.04 18.54 13.44 
1.18 177.44 0.04 17.76 13.50 
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yearS QIRAQ PRIC RESB EX CABB 
1971 1.71 1.75 32.00 0.35 0.20 
1972 1.45 3.14 35.90 0.33 0.55 
1973 2.02 3.48 29.00 0 .. 30 0.80 
1974 1.97 11.65 31.50 0.30 2.62 
1975 2,,26 11.65 35.00 0.30 2.70 
1976 2.28 11.65 34.30 0.30 2.49 
1977 2.49 12.77 34.00 0.30 2.99 
1978 2.63 13.17 34.50 0.30 - 4.15 
1979 3.48 13.83 32.10 0.30 11.07 
1980 2.51 29.29 31.00 0.30 11.01 
1981 0.99- 37.50 30.00 0.30 -11.22 
1982 0.97 34.93 29.70 0.30 -14.14 
1983 0.92 34.83 41.00 0.31 -5.99 
1984 1.20 29.83 43.00 0.31 -1.73 
1985 1.44 29.83 44.50 0.31 -0.84 
1986 1.75 28.18 44.11 0.31 -4.34 
1987 2.08 17.60 47.10 0.31 -0.06 
GNP82 GDPB pop TQOO QOO 
0.44 4.14 0.03 25.09 23.38 
0.47 4.37 0.03 26.71 25.26 
0.50 5.39 0.03 30.99 28.97 
0.54 11.62 0.03 30.75 28.77 
0.59 13.85 0.03 27.20 24.94 
0.63 18.1; 0.03 30.56 28.28 
0.67 20.46 0.03 31.42 28.92 
0.72 24.47 0.03 30.37 27.74 
0.79 38.57 0.03 30.91 27.43 
0.86 53.59 0.03 26.94 24.43 
0.94 37.29 0.03 22.68 21.69 
1.00 42.26 0.03 18.89 17.92 
1.04 42.13 0.05 17.54 16.62 
1.08 47.59 0.04 17.44 16.24 
1.11 46.80 0.03 16.12 14.68 
1.14 41.14 0.03 18.54 16.79 
1.18 53.48 0.03 17.76 15.68 
yearS QV PRIC RESB EX CABB 130 
1971 3.55 1.75 14.00 4.45 -0.01 
1972 3.22 2.45 13.90 4.40 -0.10 
1973 3.37 2.60 13.70 4.30 0.88 
1974 2.98 9.30 14.00 4.29 5.76 
1975 2.35 11.00 15.00 4.29 2.17 
1976 2.29 11.12 17.70 4.29 0.25 
1977 2.24 12.72 15.27 4.29 -3.18 
1978 2.17 12.82 18.20 4.29 -5.74 
1.979 2.36 13.36 18.00 4.29 0.35 
1980 2.16 25.20 17.87 4.29 4.73 
1981 2.11 32.88 17.95 4.29 4.00 
1982 1.89 32.88 20.30 4.29 -4.25 
1983 1.78 32.88 21.50 4.29 4.43 
1984 1.81 27.88 24.85 4.29 4.57 
1985 1.62 27.88 25.85 4.29 3.67 
1986 1.58 27.10 25.59 7.02 -1.47 
1.987 1..57 16.72 25.50 7.50 -1.13 
GNP82 GDPB POPTQOO QOO 
0.44 12.91 0.03 25.09 21.54 
0.47 13.98 0.03 26.71 23.49 
0.50 17.02 0.03 30.99 27.62 
0.54 26.19 0.03 30.75 27.77 
0.59 2"7.56 0.03 27.20 24.85 
0.63 31.49 0.03 30.56 28.26 
0.67 36.27 0.03 31.42 29.18 
0.72 39.38 0.03 30.37 28.21 
0.79 48.40 0.03 30.91 28.56 
0.86 59.22 0.03 26.94 24.78 
0.94 66.44 0.03 22.68 20.57 
1.00 67$86 0.03 18.89 17.00 
1.04 67.67 0.03 17.54 15.76 
1.08 95.40 0.03 17.44 15.63 
1.11 108.24 0.03 16.12 14.50 
1.14 70.37 0.03 18.54 16.96 
1.18 95.92 0.03 17.76 16.19 
131 
yearS QQ PRIC RESB EX CABB 
1971 0.43 1.75 4.30 4.75 0.16 
1972 0.48 2.59 6.00 4.39 0.20 
1973 0.57 2.71 7.00 4.00 0.35 
1974 0.52 11.67 6.50 3.95 1.72 
1975 0.44 11.17 6.00 3.93 1.19 
1976 0.49 11.85 5.85 3.96 1.00 
1977 0.45 13.19 5.70 3.96 0.59 
1978 0.48 13.19 5.60 3.88 0.92 
1979 0.51 14.03 4.00 3.77 1.29 
1980 0.47 29.42 3.76 3.66 2.65 
1981 0.41 37.42 3.59 3.64 2.38 
1982 0.33 35.45 3.43 3.64 1.12 
1983 0.30 34.49 3.43 3.64 0.41 
1984 0.40 29.49 3.33 3.64 0.83 
1985 0.30 29.24 3.35 3.64 0.55 
1986 0.34 28.10 3.30 3.64 -0.19 
1987 0.31 17.82 3.15 3.64 0.07 
GNPS2 GDPB pop TQOO QOO 
0.44 0.40 0.08 25.09 24.66 
0.47 0.51 0.08 26.71 26.23 
0.50 0.79 0.13 30.99 30.42 
0.54 2.40 0.06 30.75 30.23 
0.59 2.5.1 0.06 27.20 26.76 
0.63 3.28 0.06 30.56 30.07 
0.67 3.62 0.05 31.42 30.97 
0.72 3.89 0.05 30.37 29.89 
0.79 5.63 0.05 30.91 30.40 
0.86 7.83 0.09 26.94 26.47 
0.94 8.66 0.04 22.68 22.28 
1.00 7.60 0 .. 08 lac89 18.56 
1.04 6.47 0.07 17.54 17.25 
1.0S 6.70 0.03 17.44 17.04 
1.11 6.27 0.06 16.12 15.82 
1.14 4.95 0.06 18.54 18.19 
1.1S 5.36 0.06 17.76 17.45 
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yearS ••• QL PRIC RESB EX CABB 
1971 2.76 1.75 29.20 0.36 0.78 
1972 2.24 2.80 25.00 0.33 0.24 
1973 2.18 3.10 lO.40 0.30 0.07 
1974 1.52 14.30 25.50 0.30 2.70 
1975 1.51 11.98 26.60 O.lO 0.l9 
1976 1.92 12.21 26.10 0.30 2.84 
1977 2.06· ll.74 25.50 O.lO 2.16 
1978 1.99 ll.80 25.00 0.30 0.74 
1979 2.09 14.52 24.30 0.30 3.77 
1980 1.83 34.50 23.50 O.lO 8.21 
1981 1.14 40.78 23.00 O.lO -3.96 
1982 1.18 36.50 22.60 O.lO -1.56 
1983 1.08 35.10 21.50 0.30 -1.64 
1984 1.07 30.15 21.37 0.30 -1.52 
1985 1.07 30.15 21.10 0.30 2.08 
1986 1.14 30.15 21.30 0.32 -0.05 
1987 0.97 18.52 21.30 0.30 0.15 
GNP82 GDPB pop TQOO QO 
0.44 0.58 0.04 25.09 20.l2 
0.47 0.59 0.04 26.71 20.69 
0.50 0.67 0.04 lO.99 2l.39 
0.54 1.15 0.04 30.75 22.27 
0.59 1.12 0.04 27.20 20.13 
0.63 1.45 0.04 30.56 21.98 
0.67 1.71 0.04 31.42 22.22 
0.72 1.68 0.04 30.37 21.61 
0.79 2.32 0.04 30.91 21.38 
0.86 3.12 0.04 26.94 17.04 
0.94 2.77 0.04 22.68 12.87 
1.00 2.62 0.05 18.89 12.41 
1.04 2.53 0.04 17.54 12.48 
1.08 2.24 0.04 17.44 12.79 
1.11 2.13 -0.01 16.12 12.65 
1.14 2.04 0.04 18.54 13.44 
1.18 1.90 0.04 17.76 13.50 
133 
yearS QUAE PRIC RESB EX CABB 
1971 0.93 1.75 11.80 4.75 0.40 
1972 1.05 2.54 18.95 4.39 0.40 
1973 1.53 2.64 20.77 4.00 0.64 
1974 1.69 11.88 25.50 3.96 3.57 
1975 1.69 10.87 33.92 3.96 2.85 
1976 1.89 11.92 32.20 3.95 3.42 
1977 2.00 12.50 31.20 3.90 1.89 
1978 1.83 13.26 32.43 3.87 1.49 
1979 1.83 14.10 31.32 3.82 5.26 
1980 1.70 29.56 29.41 3.71 10.07 
1981 1.50 36.56 30.41 3.67 9.21 
1982 1.25 35.50 32.18 3.67 7.00 
1983 1.12 34.56 32.35 3.67 5.26 
1984 1.10 29.56 32.24 3.67 7.46 
1985 1.15 29.31 32.39 3.67 6.95 
1986 1.33 28.15 32.89 3.67 1.85 
1987 1.45 15.55 33.05 3.67 3.81 
GNP82 GOPB pop TQOO QOO 
0.44 0.93 0.19 25.09 24.16 
0.47 1.51 0.16 26.71 25.66 
0.50 2.85 0.14 30.99 29.46 
0.54 7.86 0.12 30.75 29.06 
0.59- 9.97 0.16 27.20 25.51 
0.63 12.90 0.14 30.56 28.67 
0.67 16.24 0.14 31.42 29.42 
0.72 15.68 0.13 30.37 28.54 
0.79 20.97 0.11 30.91 29.08 
0.86 29.62 0.09 26.94 25.24 
0.94 32.99 0.08 22.68 21.18 
1.00 30.62 0.07 18.89 17.64 
1.04 28.03 0.06 17.54 16.42 
1.08 27.73 0.05 17.44 16.34 
1.11 27.08 0.05 16.12 14.97 
1.14 21.33 0.04 18.54 17.21 
1.18 23.15 0.03 17.76 16.31 
yearS QALG PRIC RESB EX CABB 134 
-.. 
1971 0.77 1.75 30.00 4.91 0.04 
1972 1.05 3.54 12.25 4.49 -0.13 
1973 1.10 3.30 47.00 3.96 -0.45 
1974 1.01 14.00 7.64 4.18 0.18 
1975 0.96 12.00 7.70 3.95 -1.66 
1976 1.05 12.85 7.37 4.16 -0.89 
1977 1.12 14.30 6.80 4.15 -2.32 
1978 1.22 14.25 6.60 3.97 -3.54 
1979 1.14 14.81 6.30 3.85 -1.63 
1980 1.02 30.00 8.44 3.84 0.25 
1981 0.80 40.00 8.20 4.32 0.09 
1982 0.70 37.00 8.08 4.59 -0.18 
1983 0.70 35.50 9.44 4.79 -0.09 
1984 0.64 30.50 9.22 4.98 0.07 
1985 0.64 30.50 9.00 5.03 1.02 
1986 0.67 29.50 8.82 4.70 -2.23 
1987 0.63 17.30 8.80 4.85 0.14 
GNP82 GDPB POP TQOO QOO 
0.44 4.78 0.03 25.09 24.33 
0.47 6.10 0.03 26.71 25.66 
0.50 8.10 0.03 30.99 29.89 
0.54 11.60 0.03 30.75 29.74 
0.59 14.26 0.03 27.20 26.24 
0.63 16.45 0.03 30.56 29.51 
0.67 19.75 0.03 31.42 30.29 
0.72 26.22 0.03 30.37 29.15 
0.79 33.35 0.03 30.91 29.77 
0.86 42.35 0.03 26.94 25.92 
0.94 44.37 0.03 22.68 21.88 
1.00 45.21 0.03 18.89 18.19 
1.04 48.82 0.03 17.54 16.84 
1.08 52.15 0.03 17.44 16.80 
1.11 57.52 0.04 16.12 15.47 
1.14 59.38 0.03 lS.54 17.07 
1.18 62.37 0.07 17.76 17.13 
.... - .. _----------------------
yearS QIND PRIC RESB EX CABB 135 
1971 0.89 1.75 10.00 391.88 -0.37 
1972 1.08 2.96 10.40 415.00 -0.33 
1973 1.34 2.96 10.01 415.00 -0.48 
1974 1.38 10.80 10.50 415.00 0.60 
1975 1.31 12.60 15.00 415.00 -1.11 
1976 1.50 12.80 14.00 415.00 -0.91 
1977 1.68 13.55 10.50 415.00 -0.05 
1978 1.64 13.55 10.00 442.05 -1.41 
1979 1.59 13.90 10.20 623.06 0.98 
1980 1.58 27.50 9.60 626.99 2.86 
1981 1.60 35.00 9.50 631.76 -0.57 
1982 1.31 35.00 9.80 661.41 -5.32 
1983 1.39 34.53 9.55 909.3Q -6.34 
1984 1.47 29.53 9.10 1025.90 -1.86 
1985 1.24 29.53 8.65 1110.60 -1.92 
1986 1.26 28.53 8.50 1282.60 -3.91 
1987 1.19 17.56 8.30 1643.80 -2.15 
GNP82 GDPB pop TQOO QOO 
0.44 9.37 0.02 25.09 24.20 
0.47 11.00 0.02 26.71 25.63 
0.50 16.27 0.02 30.99 29.65 
0.54 25.80 0.02 30.75 29.37 
0.59 30.47 0.03 27.20 25.89 
0.63 37.27 -0.02 30.56 29.05 
0.67 45.81 0.02 31.4~ 29.73 
0.72 51.46 0.02 30.37 28.73 
0.79 51.40 0.02 30.91 29.32 
0.86 72.48 0.02 26.94 25.36 
0.94 92.01 0.02 22.68 21.08 
1.00 94.46 0.02 18.89 17.58 
1~04 81.05 0.02 17.54 16.16 
1.08 84.86 0.02 17.44 15.97 
1.11 85.29 0.02 16.12 14.88 
1.14 74.71 0.02 18.54 17.27 
1.18 89.29 0.02 17.76 16.57 
yearS QNIG PRIC RESS EX CABS 136 
1971 1.53 1. 75 9.30 0.71 0.41 
1972 1.82 2.80 11.68 0.66 -0.34 
1973 2.05 3.10 15.00 0.66 -0.01 
1974 2.26 12.60 20.00 0.63 4.90 
1975 1. 79 11.80 20.90 0.62 0.04 
1976 1.79 12.84 20.20 0.63 -0.36 
1977 2.07 14.33 19.50 0.64 -1.02 
1978 2.10 14.33 18.70 0.64 -3.79 
1979 1.91 14.80 18.20 0.60 1.66 
1980 2.30 29.97 17.40 0.55 5.10 
1981 2.06 40.00 16.70 0.62 -6.22 
19'82 1.45 36.50 16.50 0.67 -7.24 
1983 1.30 35.50 16.75 0.72 -4.34 
1984 1.24 30.00 16.55 0.77 0.11 
1985 1.39 28.00 16.65 0.89 2.62 
1986 1.46 28.65 16.60 1.35 0.37 
1987 1.46 18.92 16.00 4.02 1.64 
GNP82 GDPB POP TQOO QOO 
0.44 10.00 0.03 25.09 23.56 
0.47 11.67 0.03 26.71 24.89 
0.50 16.65 0.03 30.99 28.94 
0.54 29.86 0.03 30.75 28.49 
0.59 35.00 0.03 27.20 25.41 
0.63 43.76 0.03 30.56 28.77 
0.67 50.89 0.03 31.42 29.35 
0.72 55.54 0.03 30.37 23.27 
0.79 71.92 0.03 30.91 29.00 
0.86 85.53 0.03 26.94 24.64 
0.94 95.43 0.03 22.68 20.62 
1.00 93.62 0.03 18.89 17.45 
1.04 90.32 0.03 17.54 16.24 
1.08 92.61 0.03 17.44 16.20 
1.11 90.61 0.03 16.12 14.72 
1.14 60.58 0.03 18.54 17.07 
1.18 28.35 0.03 17.76 16 Q ~JO 
- - ~- --~ ~---
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yearS QK PRIC RESB EX CABB 
1971 3.00 1.75 79.95 0.36 1.81 
1972 3.28 2.37 78.20 0.33 2.01 
1973 3.02 2.48 72.90 0.30 2.58 
1974 2.55 10.85 72.75 0.29 9.07 
1975 2.09 10.37 81.45 0.29 5.93 
1976 2.15 11.30 71.20 0.29 6.93 
1977 1.97 12.37 70.55 0.29 4.56 
1978 2.10 12.27 70.10 0.28 6.13 
1979 2.50 12.83 69.44 0.28 14.03 
1980 1.66 27.50 68.53 0.27 15.30 
1981 1.13 35.50 67.93 0.28 13.78 
1982 0.82 32.30 67.73 0.29 4.87 
1983· 1.08 32.20 67.15 0.29 5.29 
1984 1.12 27.30 66.75 0.30 6.37 
1985 1.04 27.55 92.71 0.30 4.82 
1986 1.51 27.10 92.46 0.29 5.34 
1987 1.23 16.70 94.52 0.28 4.41. 
GNP82 GOPB pop TQOO (200 
0.44 3.84 0.05 25.09 22.09 
0.47 4.44 0.06 26.71 23.43 
0.50 5.35 0.06 30.99 27.97 
0.54 13.15 0.05 30.75 28.20 
0.59 12.02 0.07 27.20 25.11 
0.63 13.24 0.06 30.56 28.41 
0.67 13.99 0.06 31.42 29 .. -45 
0.72 15.21 0.06 30.37 28.27 
0.79 24.01 0.06 30.91 28.41 
0.86 27.58 0.06 26.94 25.28 
0.94 22.19 0.04 22.68 21.55 
1.00 21.15 0.05 18.89 18.07 
1.04 22.00 0.04 1.7.54 16.46 
1.08 19.43 0.05 17.44 16.32 
1.11 19.43 0.04 16.12 13.08 
1.14 16.61 0.04 18.54 17.03 
1.18 19.44 0.04 1.7.76 16.33 
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year.$ PRTS riot att str 9's 
1971 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1972 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 
1973 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1974 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1975 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1976 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1977 0.00 0.00 0 .. 00 0.00 0.00 
1978 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1979 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
1980 1.00 2.00 4.00 0.00 3.00 
1981 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.00 
1982 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 
1983 1.00 2.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
1984 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1985 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 
1986 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1987 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
yearS PRTIR riot att str qs 
1971 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 2.00 
1972 0.00· 2.00 8.00 0.00 2.00 
1973 0.00 0.00 2.00 ·0.00 3.00 
1974 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1975 2.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 3.00 
1976 0.00 0.00 17.00 0.00 1.00 
1977 0.00 2.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 
1978 12.00 62.00 13.00 9.00 31.00 
1979 49.00 59.00 65.00 3.00 44.00 
1980 34.00 20.00 35.00 1.00 29.00 
1981 14.00 11.00 55.00 0.00 42.00 
1982 2.00 1.00 70.00 0.00 16.00 
1983 1.00 5.00 13.00 0.00 3.00 
1984 8.00 0.00 10.00 0.00 1.00 
1985 4.00 0.00 24.00 0.00 1.00 
1986 1.00 0.00 9.00 0.00 2.00 
1987 0.00 0.00 9.00 0.00 0.00 
yearS PRTIQ riot att str qs 139 
1971 0.00 0.00 5.00 0.00 5:00 
1972 0.00 2.00 4.00 0.00 3.00 
1973 0.00 0.00 4.00 1.00 6.00 
1974 2.00 0.00 17.00 0.00 3.00 
1975 0.00 0.00 8.00 0.00 3.00 
1976 0.00 0.00 2.00 0.00 1.00 
1977 1.00 2.00 4.00 0.00 3.00 
1978 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
1979 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 4,,00 
1980 0.00 1.00 3.00 0.00 0.00 
1981 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
1982 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 
1983 0.00 1.00 4.00 0.00 0.00 
1984 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 
1985 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1986 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1987 0.00 0.00 2.00 0.00 0.00 
yearS PRTV riot att str qs 
1971 3.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 3.00 
1972 1.00 2.00 3.00 0.00 0.00 
1973 1.00 4.00 1.00 0.00 2.00 
1974 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1975 0.00 0.00 2.00 0.00 1.00 
1976 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
1977 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 
1978 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1979 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.00 
1980 0.00 0.00 2.00 0.00 1.00 
1981 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1982 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 
1983 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1984 1.00 0.00 2.00 1.00 0.00 
1985 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1986 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1987 2.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 
140 
yearS PRTQ riot att str qs 
1971 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1972 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1973 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1974 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1975 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1976 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1977 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 
1978 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1979 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1980 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1981 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1982 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1983 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 
1984 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1985 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1986 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
1987 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
yearS PRTL riot att str qs 
1971 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.00 
1972 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 8.00 
1973 1.00 2.00 0.00 0.00 3.00 
1974 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.00 
1975 2.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.00 
1976 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 5.00 
1977 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 
1978 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1979 3.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 
1980 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1981 0.00 0.00 2.00 0.00 0.00 
1982 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1983 O.po 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1984 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1985 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1986 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1987 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
----------------------~~ - ~----- - - -~----~---~-~ 
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yearS PRTIN riot att ---i:> """" qs 
1971 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 
1972 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 3.00 
1973 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
1974 1.00 3.00 0.00 0.00 8.00 
1975 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.00 
1976 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.00 
1977 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1978 3.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.00 
1979 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1980 2.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1981 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0 .. 00 
1982 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 7.00 
1983 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1984 0.00 2.00 OeOO 0.00 0.00 
1985 1.00 1.00 2.00 0.00 0.00 
1986 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 
1987 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
yearS PRTUAE riot att str qs 
1971 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 
1972 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.00 
1973 0.00 O~OO 2.00 0.00 0.00 
1974 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 
1975 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1976 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
1977 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 2.00 
1978 0.00 0.00 2.00 0.00 0.00 
1979 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1980 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 . 0.00 
1981 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1982 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
1983 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1984 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1985 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 
1986 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 
1987 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
yearS PRTAL riot att str gs 142 
1971 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
1972 0000 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
1973 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1974 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 
1975 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
1976 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
1977 0.00 0.00 0.00 OeOO 0.00 
1978 0.00 0.00 2.00 0.00 0.00 
1979 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1980 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 2.00 
1981 2.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 2.00 
1982 1.00 0.00 2.00 0.00 1.00 
1983 0.00 0.00 1.00 2.00 0.00 
1984 ·0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1985 0.00 0.00 ·2.00 0.00 0.00 
1986 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 
1987 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
yearS PRTN riot att str 9's 
1971 1.00 3.00 0.00 0.00 3.00 
1972 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 3.00 
1973 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 3.00 
1974 2.00 04.00 0.00 1.00 5.00 
1975 1.00 0.00 3.00 17.00 8.00 
1976 2.00 6.00 1.00 0.00 6.00 
1977 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 ·3.00 
1978 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 4.00 
1979 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 2.00 
1980 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 2.00 
1981 1.00 3.00 5.00 1.00 8.00 
1982 2 .. 00 4.00 C.OO 0.00 2.00 
1983 0.00 2.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1984 0.00 2.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 
1985 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1986 2.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
1987 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 
143 
yearS PRTK riot att str g'5 
1971 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
1972 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
1973 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1 .. 00 
1974 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 
1975 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 
1976 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 7.00 
1977 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 2.00 
1978 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
1979 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1980 0.00 0.00 2.00 0.00 0.00 
1981 0.00 0.00 0 .. 00 0.00 2.00 
1982 2.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 
1983 0.00 0.00 2.00 0.00 0.00 
1984 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 
1985 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1986 0.00 0.00 2.00 0.00 0.00 
1987 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
- - .- _ ... ~-~--------~~---------
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YEAR TQo PRIC •• ·RlQ ••• TaB 
1971.00 25.09 3.98 17.21 3.31 
1972.00 26.71 4.04 15.92 4.11 
1973.00 30.99 4.20 14.96 7.02 
1974.00 30.75 17.78 13.72 66.65 
1975.00 27.20 17.73 17.83 31.46 
1976.00 30.56 18.27 14.72 36.85 
1977.00 31.42 18.04 14.02 20.17 
1978.00 30.37 17.64 14.48 -3.78 
1979.00 30.91 16.89 14.39 59.24 
1980.00 26.94 30.23 16.11 100.21 
1981.00 22.68 34.04 19.15 44.56 
1982.00 18.89 34.00 23.11 -7.31 
1983.00 17.54 32.69 25.38 -19.72 
1984.00 17.44 26.85 25.71 -3.68 
1985.00 16.12 26.13 29.55 6.52 
1986.00 18.54 24.56 25.63 -19.96 
1987.00 17.76 14.85 26.92 -6.76 
YEAR •••• TWS •••• we ••• OPHK •• NON-oP 
1971.00 39.29 41.04 0.64 14.20 
1972.00 41.31 43.83 0.65 14.60 
1973.00 45.69 47.00 0.68 14.70 
1974.00 45.00 45.80 0.68 14.25 
1975.00 41.32 44.60 0.66 14.12 
1976.00 45.07 47.50 0.68 14.51 
1977.00 46.68 49.50 0.67 15.26 
1978.00 46.37 50.70 0.65 16.00 
1979.00 48.60 52.20. 0.64 17.69 
1980.00 45-·.23 49.70 0.60 18.29 
1981.00 41.55 47.80 0.55 18.87 
1982.00 38.79 46.30 0.49 19.90 
1983.00 38.39 45.30 0.46 20.85 
1984.00 39.52 46.80 0.44 22.08 
1985.00 39.07 46.50 0.41 22.95 
1986.00 41.06 48.00 0.45 22.52 
1987.00 40.75 48.90 0.44 22.99 
145 
Data for Target Revenue Model 
as PRte Fit 9fcm EX CABB GNP82 ~J)P8 
o -- 1.75 1.33 0.63 ~.U 0.9; 0.4' S.l:' ... I • 
6.02 1.90 2.38 0.82 4.14 2.09 0.47 G.82 
i.60 2.10 3.7S 1.53 3.71 2.52 0.50 lO.9'; 
a.';8 9.60 14.15 2.37 3.55 . 23.03 0.54 27.93 
7.00 10.46 23.19 5.03 3.52 14.39 0.59 39.69 
a.S8 1!.51 26.90 9.50 3.53 14.36 0.63 ';6.6l 
9.20 12.09 29.90 . !.c.50 3.53 11.99 0.67 5a.17 
a.7S 12.70 19.20 19.67 3."'0 -2.21 0.72 65.82 
9.53 13.34 19.27 23.22 3.36 11.17 0.79 73.91 
9.90 26.00 23.44 29.15 3.33 41.40 0.86 115.97 
9.S! 32.00 32.24 31.47 3.3a 41.13 0.94 153.91 
6.49 3';.00 29.55 35.66 3.43 7.58 1.00 153.06 
5.06 34.00 27.29 33.46 3.45 -17.14 1.04 120.19 
4.65 29.00 24.75 29.33 3.52 -11.40 1.08 105.57 
3.C7 29.00 25.00 25.20 l.n -12093 1.11 90.23 
5.10 28.00 18.32 21.65 3.'70 -11.90 1.14 75.25 
~.26 li.52 22.68 17.38 3.i5 ·9.57 1.la ~1.4; 
QK PRle FR qfcm EX CABB GNP82 
COPS 
3.00 1.75 0.19 0.36 0.36 1.11 
0.44 l.B4 
3.28 2.37 0.27 0.39 0.33 2.01 
0.47 4.44 
3.02 2.48 0.28 0.50 0.30 2.58 
0.50 5.35 
2.55 10.'85 1.25 0.76 0.29 '.07 
0.54 13.15 
2.0S 10.37 1.49 1.45 0.29 5.9J 
0.59 ~2.0~ 
2.15 11.30 1.70 1.93 0.29 6.93 
0.63 ~1.2'; 
1.97 12.37 2.88 2.al 0.29 4.56 
0.67 ~3.!9 
2.10 !2.27 2.50 2 e 82 0.28 6.13 
0.'72 :'5.2! 
2.50 12.83 2.87 2.82 0.28 14.03 
0.'79 2 •• 0l 
1.66 21.50 3.93 3.26 0.27 15.30 
0.86 ~7.5a 
1.13 35.50 4.07 0.39 0.21 13.18 
0.94 22.19 
0.82 :32.30 5.91 4.91 0.29 4.17 
1.00 21.15 
1.08 32.20 5.19 5.28 0.29 5.29 
1.04 22.00 
1.12 27.30 4.59 4.37 0.30 6.37 
1.08 19.U 
1.04 27.55 5.47 .Le3 0.30 4.82 
1.11 !9 •. n 
1.5:' 27.10 5.50 3.79 0.29 5.34 
1.U 16.61 
1.2l 16.70 4.1~ 3.11 0.28 4.4l 
1.18 :'9.4'; 
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-QV PRIC FR c;:em EX CABS GHP82 GDPS 
3.55 1. '5 1.10 3.00 4.45 -0.01 0." 12.91 
3.22 2.45 1.ll 3.60 4.40 -0.10 o.n 13.98 
3.3' 2.60 1.94 4.33 4.30 0.88 0.50 1'.02 
:.98 9.30 6.03 4.89 4.29 5.76 0.54 26.l9 
3.35 U.oo 8.40 7.13 .c.29 2.17 0.59 27.56 
:.29 11.12 8.l2 9.97 .c.29 0.25 0.63 1l.U 
2.2'; 12.72 7.74 14.10 4.29 -3.lS ·0.67 36.27 
., ,- 12.62 6.04 16.75 4.29 -5.'" 0.'2 39.3a ___ I 
2.36 13.36 7.32 15.28 .c.29 0.35 0.79 U.40 
2.16 25.20 6.60 14.95 .c.29 4.73 0.86 59.22 
2.11 32.8S 8.16 16.27 4.29 4.00 0.94 66." 
1.S9 32.3S 6.58 16.35 .c.29 -4.25 1.00 67.86 
1.7a 32.88 7.64 12.90 4.29 4.43 1.04 67.67 
1.Sl 27.88 8.90 13.38 4.29 4.57 l.OS 95.40 
1.52 27.S8 10.25 16.43 4.29 3.67 1.11 108.24 
l.5a 27.10 6.U 13.35 7.02 -1.e? 1.10; 70.37 
!.S': 16.':2 5.96 lS.08 7.50 -1.13 1.13 95.92 
QIHD PRIC Fit C;!C::l EX CABS GHP82 GDPS 
0.89 1.75 0.19 1.48 391.SS -0.37 0.44 9.37 
1.08 2.96 0.57 2.07 415.00 -O.ll 0.47 11.00 
1.34 2.96 0.81 2.91 415.00 -0.48 0.50 16.27 
1.38 10.80 1.49 4.33 415.00 0.60 0.54 25.80 
1.31 12.60 0.58 6.20 415.00 -1.11 0.59 30.47 
1.50 12.80 1.50 7.72 415.00 -0.91 0.63 37.27 
1.68 13.55 2.51 9.22 415.00 -0.05 0.67 45.81 
1.64 13.55 2.63 10.57 442.05 -1.41 0.'2 51.46 
1.59 13.90 4.06 10.76 623.06 0.98 0.79 51.40 
1.58 27.50 5.39 15.13 626.99 2.86 0.86 72.48 
1.60 35.0"0 5.01 27.42 631.76 -0.57 0.94 92.01 
1.31 35.00 3.14 26.32 661.41 -5.32 1.00 94.46 
1.39 34.53 3.72 23.83 909.30 -6.l4 1.0' Sl.OS 
1.U 29.53 4.i7 21.'2 1025.90 -1.16 1.08 84.86 
1.24 29.53 4.97 22.63 1110.60 -1.92 1.11 85.29 
1.26 28.53 4.05 18.40 1282.60 -3.91 1.14 i4. '1 
1.19 17.56 5.59 15.34 1643.80 -2.15 1.18 U.Z9 
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QALG PRIC Fa c;fa EX CABS GNP82 GDPS 
0.77 1.75 ·0.30 1.75 4.91 0.04 0.44 4.78 
1.05 3.54 0028 2.29 4.49 -O.ll 0.47 6.10 
1.10 3.30 0.91 3.36 3.96 -0.45 0.50 8.10 
1.01 14.00 1.45 4.26 4.18 0.18 0.54 11.60 
0.96 12.00 1.13 6.18 3.95 -1.6& 0.59 14.26 
1.05 12.85 1.77 7.50 4.16 -0.89 0.63 16.45 
1.12 14.30 1.68 9.47 4.15 -2.32 0.67 19.75 
1.22 14.25 1.98 12.82 3.97 -3.54 0.72 26.22 
1.14 14.81 2.66 13.09 3.85 -1.63 0.79 33.35 
1.02 30,,00 3.77 14.30 3.84 0.25 0.86 42.35 
0.80 40.00 3.70 14.58 4.32 0.09 0.94 44.37 
0.70 37.00 2.42 15.58 4.59 -0.18 1.00 45.21 
0.70 35.50 1.88 16.76 4.79 -0.09 1.04 48.82 
0.64 30.50 1.46 17.55 4.98 0.07 1.08 52.15 
0.64 30.50 2.82 18.U 5.03 1.02 1.11 57.52 
0.67 29.50 1.66 20.41 4.70 -2.23 1.14 59.38 
0.63 17.30 1.64 21.60 '.85 O.U 1.18 62.37 
QNIG PRIC FR. c;fa EX CABB GNP82 GDPS 
1.53 1.75 0.41 1.BO 0.71 0.41 0.44 10.00 
1.82 2.80 0.36 2.12 0.66 -0.34 0.47 11.67 
2.05 3.10 0.56 3.80 0.66 -0.01 0.50 16.65 
2.26 12.60 5.60 4.70 0.63 4.90 0.54 29.86 
1.79 11.80 5.59 8.10 0.62 0.04 0.59 35.00 
1.79 12.84 5.lS 12.87 0.63 -0.36 0.63 43.76 
2.07 14.33 4.23 14.72 0.64 -1.02 0.67 50.89 
2.10 14.33 1.89 14.67 0.64 -3.79 0.72 55.54 
1.91 14.80 5.55 15.17 0.60 1.66 0.79 71.92 
2.30 29.97 10.24 19.71 0.55 5.10 0.86 85.53 
2.06 40.00 3.90 17.81 0.62 -6.22 0.94 95.43 
1.45 36.50 1.61 13.40 0.67 -7.24 1.00 93.62 
1.30 35 ... 50 0.99 11.29 0.72 -4.34 1.04 90.32 
1.24 30.00 1.46 5.36 0.77 0.11 1.08 92.61 
1.39 28.00 1.67 5.98 0.89 2.62 1.11 90.61 
1.46 28.65 1.08 5.42 1.35 0.37 1.14 60.58 
1.46 18.92 1.16 2.83 4.02 1.64 1.18 28.35 
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Data for Property Rights Model 
YEAR QS GCP qcp% 
1971 4.77 0.04 0.01 
1972 6.02 0.04 0.01 
1973 7.60 1.87 0.25 
1974 8.48 4.96 0.59 
1975 7.08 4.13 0.58 
1976 8.58 5.04 0.59 
1977 9.20 5.43 0.59 
1978 8.76 4.87 0.56 
1979 9.53 5.59 0.59 
1980 9.90 9.67 0.98 
1981 9.81 9.58 0.98 
1982 6.49 6.34 0.98 
yearS QlRAN GCP qcp% 
1971 ·4.55 0.20 0.04 
1972 5.02 0.25 0.05 
1973 5.86 5.64 0.96 
1974 6.02 5.79 0096 
1975 5.35 5.12 0.96 
1976 5.92 5.66 0.95 
1977 5.70 5.39 0.95 
1978 5.21 4.96 0.95 
1979 3.17 3.00 0.95 
1980 1.66 1.47 0.88 
1981 1.38 0.00 0.00 
1982 2.28 0.00 0.00 
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yearS QL GCP C}cp% 
1911 2.76 0.01 0.00 
1972 2.24 0.08 0.04 
1973 2.18 1.22 0.56 
1974 1.52 0.92 0.51 
1975 1.S1 0.93 0.61 
1976 1.92 1.24 0.65 
1977 2.06 1.37 0.66 
1978 1.99 1.30 0.65 
1979 2.09 1.41 0.67 
1980 1.83 1.23 0.67 
1981 1.14 0.83 0.73 
1982 1.18 0.81 0.69 
yearS QIND GCP gcp% 
1971 0.89 0.11 0.12 
1972 1.08 0.18 0.16 
1973 1.34 0.31 0.23 
1974 1.38 0.42 0.30 
1975 1.31 0.44 0.34 
1976 1.50 0.55 0.37 
1977 1.68 0.73 0.43 
1978 1.64 0.73 0.45 
1979 1.S9 0.72 0.45 
1980 1.S8 0.72 0.46 
1981 1.60 0.75 0.46 
1982 1.31 0.69 0.53 
yearS QUAE GCP gcp\ 
1971 0.93 0.00 0.00 
1972 1.05 0.00 0.00 
1973 1.S3 0.33 0.21 
1974 1.69 0.83 0.4~ 
1975 1.69 0.80 0.47 
1976 1.89 1.20 0.64 
1977 2.00 1.25 0.63 
1978 1.83 1.18 0.64 
1979 1.83 1.17 0.64 
1980 1.70 1.10 ii.fi4 
1981 1.50 0.99 0.66 
1982 1.25 0.84 0.67 
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yearS QK GCP gept 
1971 3.00 0.04 0.01 
1972 3.28 0.04 0.01 
1973 3.02 0.73 0.24 
1974 2.55 1 • .tO 0.55 
1975 2.09 1.14 0.54 
1976 2.15 1.94 0.90 
1977 1.97 1.89 0.96 
1978 2.10 2.01 0.96 
1979 2.50 2.34 0.94 
1980 1.66 1.51 0.91 
1981 1.13 1.04 0.92 
1982 0.82 0.75 0.91 
yearS QNIG GCP gept 
1971 1.53 0.00 0.00 
1972 1.82 0.00 0.00 
1973 2.05 0.51 9 .. 15 
1974 2.26 1.24 0.55 
1975 1.79 0.98 0.55 
1976 1.19 1.14 0.64 
1977 2.07 1.14 0.55 
1978 2.10 1.04 0.50 
1979 1.91 1.64 0.86 
1980 2.30 1.46 0.64 
1981 2.06 1.01 0.49 
1982 1.45 0.90 0.62 
)'ear$ QALG GCP gept 
197-1 0.77· 0.55 0.71 
1972 1.05 0 •. 82 0.78 
1973 1.10 0.84 0.76 
1974 1.01 0.77 0.76 
1975 0.96 0.76 0.79 
1976 1.05 0.97 0.93 
1977 1.12 1.0~ 0.92 
1978 1.22 1.03 0.84 
1979 1.14 1.06 0.93 
1980 1.02 0.96 0.94 
1981 0.80 0.79 0.98 
1982 0.70 0.70 0.99 
------------------------------------------------------------
